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ral histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Dr. Phil E. DePoy worked in the historic
Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) and
was President and CEO of the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA), later serving on
the CNA Board of Trustees for 21 years.
The original interview was conducted
August 24, 2004 at the Office of Naval
Research, Arlington, Virginia, and a follow-
up interview was initiated June 17, 2014
at the 82nd MORS Symposium Heritage
Session on ‘‘Early Navy and Marine Opera-
tions Research.’’
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Dr. Phil E. DePoy,
Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, Interviewer
Bob Sheldon: This is the 24th of August,
2004, and I’m here to interview Phil DePoy.
First of all, tell us your parents’ names and
where you were born and raised.
Phil DePoy: I was born in September
1935 and raised in a small town, Frankfort,
in central Indiana. Harry was my father,
andMary wasmymother. I had one sibling,
a sister, who was nine years older than me.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us a little about your
parents and how they influenced you.
Phil DePoy:My father worked on a rail-
road in the Civil Engineering Department.
He was not an engineer, and I don’t believe
either he or my mother influenced me in
terms of my major. They did, however,
strongly insist that I go to college as far back
as I can remember. Interestingly, they did
not even offer college to my sister who
was a much better student than me. In that
era and that locale, it was not common for
girls to attend college.
Bob Sheldon:Where did you go to junior
high and high school?
Phil DePoy: In Frankfort.
Bob Sheldon:Did you take an early inter-
est in math and science in school?
Phil DePoy: Yes, starting with biology as
a high school freshman. I decided that I
liked math sometime in my high school
sophomore or junior year.
Bob Sheldon:Where did you go to college?
Phil DePoy: Throughout my high school
days, I assumed that I would go to Purdue
University when I graduated and study
engineering—since Purduewas only 20miles
frommy home.While I was in high school,
I was very interested in nuclear physics.
I’m not certain why I had so much interest
in the nuclear field, other than it was a nat-
ural follow-on to the extensive amateur
research I had done with conventional ex-
plosives. The evidence of my research still
exists on the walls of the garage next to my
former home; portions of the walls have
obviously been replaced. At the time,
Purdue didn’t have a separate nuclear en-
gineering program but had a nuclear op-
tion in chemical engineering. So I spent
four years in the Chemical Engineering
Department, graduating in 1957.
Bob Sheldon: Can you tell us a little more
about your ‘‘amateur research with conven-
tional explosives’’?
Phil DePoy: I experimented with a num-
ber of minor explosives but my favorite was
nitrogen triiodide. It was easy to make and
was relatively stable in the liquid form but
very unstable when it dried. It was fun to
paint it on desks and have it explode when
someonedropped their books on thedesktop.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go after
graduation?
Phil DePoy: After graduation, I received
anAEC (AtomicEnergyCommission) fellow-
ship to study nuclear engineering at MIT (the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Bob Sheldon: How did you get that AEC
fellowship for MIT?
Phil DePoy:At the suggestionof aPurdue
Chemical Engineeringprofessor,Al Sesonske,
I applied for it during my senior year.
At the time, I planned to work toward
a PhD at MIT, but during my first year, nu-
clear engineering, both in the government
and in the private sector, lost support; few
jobs were available in the field; and money
for nuclear engineering fellowships was re-
duced. I feared that this would be a long-
term condition so I decided to switch back
to chemical engineering. I completed my
master’s degree at MIT and transferred to
Stanford’s chemical engineering program,
which was fairly new at the time.
Bob Sheldon: Why did you choose Stan-
ford for your PhD studies?
Phil DePoy: I applied for a fellowship to
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Departments, and Stanford made me the best of-
fer. During my first year at Stanford, I completed
my coursework requirements, passed the neces-
sary qualification exams, and built the equip-
ment, a 25-foot shock tube, for my research. I
made the fateful decision that I could take a full-
time job (hopefully in the Bay Area) and easily
collect the data and write my dissertation on
a part-time basis over the next couple years. As
things turned out, it took me nine years to write
my dissertation and to complete the oral defense.
I finished with a PhD in chemical engineering.
Bob Sheldon: What did you do your thesis
work on?
Phil DePoy: Actually it ended up as two
topics. The first one was kinetics of the decom-
position of nitric dioxide at very high tempera-
tures using a shock tube. The second topic was
the kinetics of chemical oscillating systems.
Bob Sheldon: Who was your chairman?
Phil DePoy:My thesis advisor was Professor
David Mason. Professor Mason was also chair
of the Chemical Engineering Department.
Bob Sheldon:Did youmeet any other notable
people at Stanford?
Phil DePoy: One was Linus Pauling. When I
went back to Stanford for a sabbatical in 1968,
Linus and his research team had just arrived
from Cal Tech. Dave Mason had known Linus
when he taught at Cal Tech and offered a posi-
tion to him at Stanford when Cal Tech had some
problems with him. Dave gave Linus and his
team several offices and a laboratory in the
chemical engineering building. Shortly before I
arrived, Linus wrote a letter to the president of
Stanford complaining about his spaces being in-
adequate, without telling Dave. Dave was very
upset and asked me to talk with Linus about it.
We had several interesting conversations, mostly
about vitaminC,whichwasLinus’s favorite topic
at the time. I made no progress with him on the
space issue so turned it back over to Dave.
Bob Sheldon: Coming out of Stanford, did
your thesis get you a job?
Phil DePoy:No, because I chose a totally dif-
ferent field. I joined the OEG (Operations Eval-
uation Group) prior to finishing my thesis.
I knew about OEG because when I was at
MIT, a friend convinced me to audit a physics
course presented by Professor Philip Morse, the
founding Director of ASWORG during World
War II. (ASWORG, the Antisubmarine Warfare
Operations Research Group, was established in
April 1942 patterned after the ‘‘operational re-
search’’ group which had been formed earlier in
the UK. Later in the war, when the group was
working on many issues other than antisubma-
rine warfare, its name was changed to the Opera-
tions Research Group, or ORG; after the war, the
name was changed to the Operations Evaluation
Group, OEG.) The MIT course was based on
a two-volume set of books, Methods of Theoretical
Physics, which was being written by Professor
Morse and Professor Herman Feshbach. Several
times in his lectures, Morse mentioned experi-
ences he had in ASWORG during the war.
Frankly, I didn’t understand much of what he
taught, and as it later turned out, even less ofwhat
ASWORG and ORGwere about. I was fascinated
by some three-dimensional graphicsMorse had in
the handouts so I went to his office to see him
a couple times to learn howhemade them. I think
he had the mistaken impression that I was inter-
ested in and understood the content of his course.
Bob Sheldon: Did someone from OEG come
out to Stanford to recruit you?
Phil DePoy: When I began to interview for
jobs, I spoke with several chemical companies
that were located in California, and I had almost
settled on a position in the Bay Area when I saw
a notice in the Stanford recruiting office that
‘‘MIT OEG’’ was interviewing the next day. I
signed up to talk with the interviewer, more
out of curiosity than interest. As I recall, the an-
nouncement was only for physicists, but when I
mentioned to the interviewer that I knewMorse,
he invited me to Washington for interviews.
The interviews were unlike anything I had
experienced before. Several people posed prob-
lems tome and askedme how Iwould approach
them, which I had never experienced in any of
my previous interviews. At the end of the day,
I met with Jacinto (Jay) Steinhardt who had
joined the group during the war and had been
Director of OEG since 1946. Steinhardt men-
tioned that he had spoken with Morse and Pro-
fessor Robley Evans, another one of my MIT
physics professors, about me. After the day’s in-
terviews, I still didn’t understand exactly what
OEG did, but I was very impressed by the inter-
views. I decided that OEG might provide me
a good experience for a couple years before
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finding a chemical engineering job. Besides, I
was attracted by the prospect of overseas travel
and working in the Pentagon with the military.
So I accepted the offer and reported to work
on June 13, 1959.
Bob Sheldon: What was OEG like when you
got there?
Phil DePoy: At the time, OEG consisted of
approximately 60 analysts, of whom 15 were
in field assignments with the Navy around the
world and the remainder were in an office on
the fifth floor of the Pentagon. There were a sig-
nificant number of analysts still in the organiza-
tion that had joined during World War II, many
of whom had joined directly from the physics
department at MIT. The field assignments were
typically one year long, with the exception of
the analysts assigned to the two deployed fleets,
who were assigned for 18 months. For those as-
signments, the first half of the assignment (nine
months) was spent with the Carrier Task Force
Commander aboard one of the aircraft car-
riers in the fleet and the last half with the Fleet
Commander aboard a cruiser.
Bob Sheldon: Earlier, you said that you met
Jay Steinhardt during your interview. How
was it working for him?
Phil DePoy: Steinhardt was probably the
best, albeit the toughest, boss I ever had. In ad-
dition to being Director of OEG, he still taught
at MIT. As I recall, during the school year, he
taught two days a week on campus and worked
at OEG in the Pentagon the other three days,
commuting back and forth by train. During
the summer, he often went to one of the
deployed fleets, sent the OEG representative
on leave, and replaced him for amonth or so just
in order to keep up with Navy operational is-
sues. By today’s standards, Steinhardt was very
strict and could be very difficult. Many times I
heard him say that he ‘‘hired with 50 percent re-
liability and fired with 75 percent reliability.’’
He had an annual quota for departures; he
wanted 12 percent of the analysts to leave each
year, half voluntarily and half involuntarily,
and he usually reached his goal—especially in
the latter category!
Steinhardt was very insistent on careful
analysis and documentation of results. He him-
self reviewed nearly everything that went out of
OEG and everything that was done by the field
representatives. Jay read every field letter that
every field representative wrote, and he would
write critical comments to them. (Field repre-
sentatives were required to write one letter
a month to Jay describing their accomplish-
ments during the month and attaching the
memoranda that they had completed.)
Steinhardt insisted on creative work. If he
found people doing only the rote sorts of things
(which it’s easy to dowith tasks such as exercise
reconstruction), they would get a note from Jay.
Or worse, they would get a phone call. Or even
worse than that, a visit! It was a small organiza-
tion in those days, and boy, we’d all be called on
the carpet frequently for all sorts of infractions,
ranging from those involved with the quality or
quantity of our work to such things as going out
of our office spaces without wearing our suit
coat! And I believe Jay was responsible for OEG’s
survival. The fact thatOEGsurvived in the period
betweenWorldWar II and the KoreanWar was
phenomenal because very few defense science
organizations such as OEG continued to exist.
And the same thing occurred between the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. Jay kept OEG alive,
and I think anyone who worked in OEG never
forgot the experience of working for him.
Bob Sheldon: You’ve studied extensively
about the historical development of military op-
erations research. Tell us your perspective on
the early history of OR.
Phil DePoy: Discussions of the history of
military operations research often start with
the creation of a group of scientists working
for Sir P.M.S. Blackett in England in 1939,
shortly after the outbreak of World War II, and
the subsequent formation of ASWORG under
Professor Philip Morse in the United States
in April 1942. However, as described by Keith
Tidman in his book, The Operations Evaluation
Group: A History of Naval Operations Analysis, ex-
amples of applications of science to warfare
date back to Archimedes, and that true ‘‘oper-
ations research’’ emerged in World War I with
thework by Frederick Lanchester in England and
with the Naval Consulting Board chaired by
Thomas Edison in the United States. Since there
is very limited evidence of operations research
being done between World Wars I and II, it is
not surprising that most consider Blackett and
Morse as the originators of the field.
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P.M.S. Blackett was a noted physicist who
was teaching at Manchester before the war.
His research was later recognized by awarding
him the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1948. At
the start of the war, he joined the British Anti-
Aircraft Command (AAC) as scientific counsel,
and soon thereafter he formed a small group
of scientists, including both physicists and
chemists, into a research group to assist the
command with improving the operational use
of radar in the defense against German air at-
tacks. His group was very successful and be-
came known as ‘‘Blackett’s Circus.’’ In the
spring of 1941, Blackett was asked to transfer
to the Coastal Command to assist with the de-
fense of the shipping lanes against German
U-boats. He again formed a small group, which
was called the Operational Research Section.
His group was highly successful and after nine
months, it was transferred to the Admiralty. A
single analysis effort, which resulted in a small
change of tactics in the delivery of depth
charges, increased the kill rate from 2 or 3 per-
cent to 40 percent and is still frequently refer-
enced as one of the great early successes of
operations research.
The British success with operations re-
search received a great deal of attention in the
US, and a decision was reached in the US Navy
to form a similar group, which became known
as ASWORG. In March 1942, Professor Philip
Morse of MIT was asked to head the group.
Morse recruited Dr. William Shockley (who re-
ceived the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1960 for
his work in the development of the transistor)
from Bell Telephone Laboratories as his deputy
and a number of other eminent scientists,
mostly physicists and chemists, to join them.
Initially, ASWORG concentrated on antisubma-
rine warfare in the Atlantic. A subgroup, the
Submarine Operations Research Group (SORG)
was formed inNovember 1943 as a result of a re-
quest by the Commander Submarines, Pacific
Fleet. Other subgroups soon followed, includ-
ing theAirOperationsResearchGroup (AirORG),
the Antiaircraft Operations Research Group
(AAORG), the Special Defense Operations Re-
search Group (SpecORG), and the Amphibious
Operations Research Group (PhibORG), and
the entire organization was renamed the Opera-
tions Research Group (ORG). Like Blackett’s
group, ASWORG and ORG were very success-
ful throughout the war, and in the fall of 1945,
the Navy decided that the group should con-
tinue to exist in peacetime under the sponsor-
ship of a university. MIT was selected as the
sponsor and the namewas changed to the Oper-
ations Evaluation Group (OEG).
Bob Sheldon: Do you have any favorite re-
ports from the early days?
Phil DePoy: My favorite report is the first
ASWORG study that was done during the first
threeweeks after the groupwas formed in April
1942. (ASWORG Memo 1, Preliminary Report
on the Submarine Search Problem, May 1,
1942) The authors had absolutely no previous
knowledge of antisubmarine warfare. Yet, their
study laid the foundations of search theory, an
area in which so much work has been done
since that time.
One of the things that struck me about
many of the World War II analyses was that
most of the ASWORG analysts were very good
scientists, but they didn’t mind using very sim-
ple approaches to solve problems. An example
of that is the analysis that I mentioned earlier
that was done in England to determine what
depth to set off depth charges. It was a very sim-
ple observation that if the submarine had dived
very long before a depth charge was dropped,
the uncertainty in its location would be great,
and it was unlikely that the depth charge would
damage the submarine. It was therefore recom-
mended that the depth charge be detonated at
a shallow depth. The point that Phil Morse
and Jay Steinhardt always made was to care-
fully define the problem and then to solve it
with the simplest approach possible.
Bob Sheldon:How did the early practitioners
come to define operations research?
Phil DePoy: Blackett wrote two important
papers, ‘‘Scientists and the Operational Level’’
in 1941 and ‘‘A Note on Certain Aspects of
the Methodology of Operational Research’’ in
1943, which attracted much attention in the
US. His definition of OR was simply ‘‘the anal-
ysis of data in order to give useful advice.’’
Morse, along with George Kimball (a member
of ASWORG) wrote a book after the war,
Methods of Operations Research [Editor’s note:
MORS republished this book in 1998], in which
OR was defined as ‘‘a scientific method of
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providing executive departments with a quanti-
tative basis for decisions regarding the opera-
tions under their control.’’ In his book, In at the
Beginnings, Morse said that another term for
OR is ‘‘systems analysis.’’
None of these definitions is very explana-
tory of the work that was done by ‘‘Blackett’s
Circus,’’ ASWORG, ORG, or OEG. I much pre-
fer a definition that is included in a draft book
by Marc Mangel, a one-time member of OEG
and a professor at the University of California,
Santa Cruz. ‘‘OR attempts to bring the scientific
approach to problems for which the fundamen-
tal laws governing the processes are either un-
known or too complex to derive from first
principles.’’ I would add to Mangel’s definition
of problems that there are also cases in which
we might know the fundamental laws but do
not know the value of many of the parameters
associated with them. This is particularly true
for combat systems in which we don’t know
the enemies’ effectiveness and may not have
a good idea of how our own systems work in
a combat environment.
AsMangel points out in his draft book, with
the introduction ofMorse and Kimball’s book in
1951, the introduction of modern computing
about the same time, and the explosion of aca-
demic OR departments in the 1950s and 1960s,
OR soon became a collection of techniques such
as mathematical programming, search theory,
etc. So we now have two very different disci-
plines with the same name. For years, these dif-
ferences could be seen at ORSA (the Operations
Research Society of America, later INFORMS—
the Institute for Operations Research and the
Management Sciences) and MORS meetings,
with the people in one discipline confused by
the types of problems and the approaches that
people of the other discipline were using. When
I was Director of OEG and President of CNA, I
was hesitant to allow junior analysts to attend
ORSA and MORS meetings because, as I’ll ex-
plain later, the skills we were trying to develop
with them were very different from the ones
used by the other discipline.
Rather than trying to further expand on
Mangel’s definition of OR, I will talk about some
of the skills that we tried to develop in opera-
tional analysis (I’ll use that name to avoid con-
fusion with the name operations research,
which I’ll use for the newer discipline.) I’ll refer
to the training of new analysts during the period
1946 to 1962 when Jay Steinhardt was Director
of OEG, and OEG transitioned from a wartime
to a peacetime footing (except during the Korean
War from 1950 to 1953).
Bob Sheldon: In that early historical con-
text, how did analysts learn to do ‘‘operations
analysis’’?
Phil DePoy: By far, the most difficult thing to
teach new operations analysts was unstruc-
tured problem solving, i.e., as Mangel describes
it in his definition of OA, ‘‘problems for which
the fundamental laws governing the processes
are either unknown or too complex to derive
from first principles.’’ Most military operations
are very complex, involve large numbers of peo-
ple and systems, and have an unpredictable en-
emy. (As we learned from the work at the Santa
Fe Institute, many combat operations are, in
fact, complex adaptive processes.)
Most physical scientists had not encoun-
tered these types of problems during their edu-
cation or in their previous experience, and they
have to be trained to think about problems dif-
ferently and realize that there are no recipes. (I
have been told that an increasing number of
new OA analysts have been exposed to com-
plex, cross-discipline, collaborative problem
solving in school and have an easier time learn-
ing OA.) OEG learned over many years to start
new analysts with reasonably well-structured
problems, even though in most of the problems,
the values of the parameters were not well
known. Then they would be presented with
gradually more unstructured issues. We always
had a few analysts that couldn’t seem to adapt
and would resign after a few months.
I learned more about difficulties in dealing
with unstructured problems in the late 1960s. I
spent a period as the director of the Southeast
Asia Analysis Group inOEGWashington. In ad-
dition to our civilian analysts, we had up to 15
Navy analysts, some of whom had already
served tours as aviators in Vietnam, in the
group. One day, one of the Navy analysts came
to me and said that he was not feeling well and
needed to go to the Bethesda Naval Hospital for
diagnosis. I didn’t hear from him for a few days
and was concerned that he might have a serious
health issue. A few days later, I received a call
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from aNavy psychiatrist who askedme to come
to the hospital to discuss the case. It turned out
that our analyst had experienced a major break-
down, and the psychiatrist wanted to know
more about his behavior leading up to the crisis.
Iwas allowed tomeetwith the patient for a short
time, but hewas very angry andwouldn’t speak
with me.
A couple weeks later, the psychiatrist called
me to report that they had discussed the case at
their weekly seminar, and that one senior psy-
chiatrist had told everyone that he was the only
person in the room who understood what had
happened to our analyst. The psychiatrist
explained that he had majored in physics and
had taken a job with RAND in the early 1950s.
After a short time, he had a breakdown and
explained that he couldn’t deal with the lack
of structure in what he was trying to do. After
he recovered, he went to medical school and
became a psychiatrist. In discussions with
the senior psychiatrist, I learned how he
reacted and realized that some of our former
employees who hadn’t seemed to grasp the
work might have been unable to deal with
the lack of structure. (For several years, I
enjoyed calling it the ‘‘RAND disease’’ and
telling my friends at RAND that the disease
had originated there.)
Bob Sheldon: I know that INFORMS has
a prize named after Jay Steinhardt, so his name
is widely recognized in the OR community.
How did Steinhardt influence the development
of the analysts at OEG?
Phil DePoy: The second most difficult thing
to develop in operations analysts is critical
thinking. I think nearly every professor I had
in graduate school felt that they were teaching
‘‘critical thinking.’’ I learned when I arrived in
OEG that Steinhardt’s definition of critical
thinking was much different than anything I
had encountered before. Nearly every docu-
ment that OEG analysts produced, including
letters from the field representatives, was circu-
lated to all of us with a ‘‘route slip’’ listing all of
our names. We were expected to make com-
ments on most of what we read, and Jay read
everyone’s comments. We also had weekly
seminars in which everyone was expected to
offer comments. Periodically Steinhardt would
meet with each of us, and the quality and quantity
of our reviews were discussed along with the
quality and quantity of our products.
When Iwas President of CNA, I noticed that
our new economists were significantly better at
critical thinking than most of our other new em-
ployees. Nearly all our economists came to us
from the University of Chicago, so when I de-
cided to take a job there after I left CNA, I
wanted to learn how their economics faculty
taught critical thinking. Whenever I was avail-
able, I attended the seminars in the economics
department and sat in on some classes taught
by Gary Becker and Jim Heckman (both Nobel
Laureates in Economics). It didn’t take long to
understand why they were so effective in teach-
ing critical thinking. I also found that some pro-
fessors in other departments at Chicago were
equally effective, such a John Mearsheimer in
the Political ScienceDepartment. One technique
used by several professors was to begin some
classeswith a strong statement about something
the students were studying. The students were
expected to actively debate the professor and
were graded on the content of their arguments.
Often the debates would become quite heated.
Before the end of the class, the professor would
review the student’s arguments, point out their
errors, and explain what they should have ques-
tioned. It was evident that Steinhardt used
something akin to their teaching methods, and
he was far more successful at making us think
critically than anyone I had encountered, that
is, until I moved to Chicago.
In all my interactions with Navy staffs, I
was very impressed that senior officers were al-
most always receptive to critical assessments.
Even during combat operations—perhaps espe-
cially during combat operations—they would
always listen and discuss my observations thor-
oughly with me despite being extremely busy. I
had one experience that I have never forgotten.
Near the end of the Vietnam War, I spent a few
months with a staff on an aircraft carrier to eval-
uate a new experimental weapon. I observed
that the Commander, a Vice Admiral, was only
sleeping three to four hours per day. He slept
about two hours late at night and an additional
one to two hours each afternoon by going up
to the signal bridge of the carrier and lying
in the sun. I was very concerned about one
thing that was done repeatedly during major
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strike operations and wanted to talk with him
when none of his staff were present. So several
times I met him on the signal bridge and dis-
cussed the issues with him for at least 30 min-
utes. I was unable to convince him to change
the operations, but he never once asked me to
leave him alone. When I left the ship, I expected
that he was probably angry with me even
though he never displayed it. About six months
later, someone sent me a copy of his congressio-
nal testimony that he was called back to Wash-
ington to give. He had discussed the Navy
strike operations in detail and, at one point,
had said that I had not agreed with the way
one phase was being conducted. He said that
he felt obligated to tell them because he had
a lot of respect for me and was still concerned
that he may have made the wrong decision.
In later years, after the Admiral retired from
the Navy, we became very close friends. A few
times we discussed our interactions during that
period aboard the USS Enterprise. He said he
had to make so many life-and-death decisions
that he was always more comfortable when he
had an experienced OEG representative aboard
to give him critical feedback. He said that he
never could depend on it from his staff officers,
even though he had an excellent staff, and
reminded me of how much other feedback I
had given him that I had long since forgotten.
There is no question that the military rank sys-
tem often inhibits critical feedback, which was
recognized by Blackett, and was the reason that
both Morse and Steinhardt emphasized critical
thinking so much. The Admiral told me that
he learned to depend on OEG during the Ko-
rean War when he worked with John Coyle,
who had been my mentor when I joined the
group.
One thing I experienced with some admi-
rals, and which was also experienced by other
analysts, was that admirals would sometimes
confide things in us that they would not tell
their senior staff members. I never understood
it. One incident which I will never forget oc-
curredwhen I spent nearly four hours in aHong
Kong hotel room with an admiral immediately
after he learned that his sonwasmissing in com-
bat. He sobbed the entire time, and it was a very
difficult experience for me. Afterward, we
went to a meeting with his senior staff, and
he behaved as if nothing had happened. One
or two officers came up to him to express their
sorrow, and he waved them off. A few staff
members mentioned to me that the Admiral
was the ‘‘toughest man’’ they had ever known
since he showed absolutely no emotion. I didn’t
tell any of them about my earlier experience
with him.
Bob Sheldon: In those early days of OR, what
was important for the analysts to know about
‘‘operations’’?
Phil DePoy: One of the first things that
Blackett learned was that it is essential for the
operations analysts to have significant exposure
to actual operations. Since most military opera-
tions are complex, no written or verbal descrip-
tion is adequate to gain an understanding of
them. As I mentioned earlier, shortly before
ASWORG was started, Blackett sent one of his
analysts, Peter Pearman, to Washington to meet
with Morse and Shockley. Blackett emphasized
very strongly that the analysts had to be sta-
tioned with the operational units. This was eas-
ier said than done in both the UK and the US
Navies. Neither Navy had experience with em-
bedding civilian analysts within operational
staffs, and there was a great deal of opposition
to the practice, even though a famous scientist
once said, ‘‘If instead of sending the observa-
tions of able seamen to able mathematicians
on land, the land would send able mathemati-
cians to sea, it would signify much more to the
improvement of navigation and to the safety
of men’s lives and estates on that element’’
(Isaac Newton, 1694). Initially, the British
appointed the analysts as officers in order to
make the transition easier. The leadership of
the US Navy recognized the potential value
and, from the first, embedded the analysts
aboard ships with the senior operational com-
mands.
Morse developed a rotation plan among the
analysts in which they spent six months with an
operational unit, then rotated back to Washing-
ton for sixmonths, thereby keeping each analyst
half time in the fleet and half time in Washing-
ton. He felt that six months was the maximum
that he wanted them to be with any one com-
mand, since if they stayed longer, they would
be assimilated within the staff and effectively
become too close to the Naval officers, and they
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would be less likely to raise questions about
practices and decisions. He also felt that the
six months back in Washington permitted
them to share what they had learned with
other analysts.
In later years, it became more and more dif-
ficult to maintain a rotation plan even close to
the wartime plan. By the time I arrived in
1959, OEG had gone to one-year deployments
with most commands, followed by two years
in Washington for all but the very senior ana-
lysts: hence a one-third/two-thirds rotation. In
the years following, the time at commands
had to be extended longer because of spouse
employment and the difficulties of moving
school-age children.
There is no question that analysts develop
close relationships with the staff members after
only a few months, and many of them cease to
critically review the command’s operational
practices and decisions. When I first arrived in
OEG, Steinhardt said that he could tell within
a few minutes of visiting a field representative
if they were too closely integrated with the staff.
The one time he visited me in the field, I warned
everyone not to say anything nice about me! He
also told us frequently that if the entire staff
agreed with their admiral on any matter, it
was probably wrong, and it was our job to find
the problem. (Steinhardt was ahead of his time;
in 1972 Irv Janis, a Yale professor, published his
book Victims of Groupthink.)
Bob Sheldon:How did OEG allocate analysts
to the field?
Phil DePoy: From their earliest days, both
‘‘Blackett’s Circus’’ and ASWORG had a prac-
tice of assigning only one analyst to a command,
which, for the most part, still is the practice.
Undoubtedly, in the earliest days of both organi-
zations, neither had the resources to assignmul-
tiple analysts, independent of the need. And
because of the very limited space aboard ships,
it would have been difficult to justify having
two or more analysts assigned to the same com-
mand, especially during combat operations. But
both Blackett and Morse had very strong opin-
ions that if more than one analyst is stationed
on a ship, they will be most comfortable talking
with one another; if only one analyst is present,
he or she will talk with the Naval officers and
learn much more about the operations than he
or she would otherwise. Having experienced
both situations, I believe that they were correct,
particularly with inexperienced analysts. In my
time in the fleet, we didn’t have email or chat
available to us, and the only way we could com-
municate with other analysts was by mail and
Navy messages. I’m certain that this huge im-
provement in communications has been invalu-
able for all the deployed analysts.
Being the only civilian on a ship, inexperi-
enced analysts are placed in many difficult situ-
ations since they don’t understand Navy
protocol, and most Navy officers don’t know
how the analysts fit into the rank structure. As
a result, there aremany ‘‘sea stories’’ in the fleets
about faux pas committed by OEG analysts.
Several of mine, committed in the 1960s, are
probably still discussed in the western Pacific.
Bob Sheldon: How about the level at which
OEG analysts were historically assigned in the
field?
Phil DePoy: Blackett had been a Naval offi-
cer duringWorldWar I and understoodmilitary
structure, so he insisted that his analysts be
assigned to the CommandingOfficer ofwhatever
organization they were in. This gave analysts
greater freedom to work throughout the organi-
zation and gave them ‘‘top-cover’’ when an offi-
cer within the command disagreed with their
recommendations. For years, OEG representa-
tives carried an ID card, which was very similar
to an officer’s ID card. Under ‘‘rank,’’ the entry
was ‘‘up to VAdm.’’ This only increased the
uncertainty among everyone about how to
treat us, e.g., where to seat us in the Officers’
or FlagMess, but in general, the Navy handled
it very well. And it does make the issue of
‘‘point-of-attachment’’ easier.
As I mentioned earlier, the analyst whom
Blackett sent to meet with Morse and Shockley
emphasized the importance of the point of at-
tachment, so ASWORG was assigned to the
Chief of Naval Operations, which continued
throughout World War II and still exists for
CNA today.
Bob Sheldon: What was the background of
the more successful analysts in OEG?
Phil DePoy: Originally both Blackett and
Morse recruited mostly physicists and physical
chemists. Morse also hired a group of actuaries
but it appears that they were mostly used in the
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Washington office for data processing. ASWORG
was made up nearly entirely of physicists, chem-
ists, and applied mathematicians. I came to OEG
in 1959 and had an engineering background,
and there were already one or two engineers
in the group. Over the years, OEG recruited
a wide variety of disciplines and has had suc-
cess in developing good analysts from most of
the disciplines. Looking back over the time
when I was in the organization, I believe that
most of its very best analysts were physicists,
chemists, and applied mathematicians—possibly
because so many hires came from those disci-
plines. Surprisingly, in my experience, statisti-
cians and people trained in OR, with a few
exceptions, did not do well. I believe it was
more difficult for them to adapt to OA, having
been trained in themore structuredOR environ-
ment. We had the same problem with Naval of-
ficers. For many years, we had approximately
20 officers assigned to CNA’sWashington office.
Nearly all of them had operational experience
and about a third of themhad advanced degrees
in OR from NPS (Naval Postgraduate School).
Many of the OR-trained officers had a difficult
time adapting to the CNA environment because
they expected amore structured approach to the
studies to which they were assigned. The offi-
cers with advanced degrees in physics and engi-
neering found it much easier to adapt. As I have
mentioned previously, this is another area which
I’m told has changed a great deal since people in
many other disciplines have experience with
complex systems and cross-disciplinary problem
solving.
Bob Sheldon: Do OEG analysts tend to spe-
cialize in warfighting areas?
Phil DePoy:Obviously, when operations an-
alysts are assigned to many commands, such as
the Fleet Commander, they need to know about
all warfare areas, but most specialize in one or
two warfare areas (e.g., antisubmarine warfare)
for their entire career. This is another major dif-
ferencewith OR inwhich analysts typically spe-
cialize in a few techniques (e.g., mathematical
programming) and can apply them across
a broad spectrum of areas. I believe this is the
major problem that OR-trained analysts con-
front in the OA environment. I recall one case
in which an OR-trained officer assigned to
CNA wrote a memorandum to a senior officer
in which he said that CNA did not know how
to do studies; he had not found a single study
inwhichmathematical programmingwas being
used (the area in which he had majored in grad-
uate school).
Bob Sheldon: INFORMS uses the slogan ‘‘the
science of better.’’ How much was ‘‘better’’ in
the historical OEG thinking?
Phil DePoy: Evenmore difficult formany an-
alysts to accept than unstructured problems
was Morse’s concept of ‘‘hemibel thinking.’’
(A hemibel is the square root of 10, or approxi-
mately 3.) Due to the types of problems encoun-
tered in OA, Morse claimed that unless the
analysis demonstrates that a recommended
change would result in an improvement by
a factor of a hemibel or more, it is probably
not meaningful. This concept was always diffi-
cult to communicate in the 1950s, butwas nearly
impossible after digital computers became com-
monplace. Having read many of the studies
done by ASWORG/ORG, I don’t think that
many of the wartime analysts accepted it either.
Having had ‘‘significant figures’’ beaten intome
by the MIT physics department (including
Morse), I always warned OEG analysts to take
care not to state results to more significant fig-
ures than they could justify on the basis of
how well the values of input parameters were
known, but I can’t claim any more success than
Morse had with ‘‘hemibel thinking.’’
In nearly every subject I have discussed,
from ‘‘what is OR?’’ to ‘‘lack of precision,’’ I be-
lieve that the differences between OR as cur-
rently taught and practiced in most quarters
andOA, as taught and practiced inOEG, RAND,
and a few management consulting firms (partic-
ularly those that specialize in company strate-
gies) are very obvious. In fact, they are almost
polar opposites. I want to emphasize that one is
not better or worse than the other, only that they
are different. If Iwere tomake a recommendation
toMORS, it would be that they recognize the dif-
ference between OR and OA and try to help the
community understand the distinction and to
recognize that they are focusing on OR.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to your career,
what did you work on during your early days
at OEG?
Phil DePoy: I was initially assigned amentor,
John Coyle, who had joined ASWORG during
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World War II, and was working on nuclear de-
terrence issues. He was very bright and very
well-regarded by theNavy. Johnwas amaverick
in every sense of the word! His father was
awell-knownarchitect, andobviouslyamaverick,
too. I remember John telling me that after he
was admitted to Princeton as an undergraduate,
he was trying to decide on amajor. He asked his
father for advice, and his father asked himwhat
he thought he would like to do after graduation.
John said that he thought he would like to be
a research chemist. His father advised him then
to major in English literature because he would
learn plenty of chemistry when he worked as
a chemist. So John studied English literature,
then became a research chemist at a company
in South America. At the start of World War II,
John returned to the US and joined ASWORG.
John took me with him to meetings with many
senior officers, including the CNO (Chief of Na-
val Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke) and
Admiral Rickover. Nomatter who asked a ques-
tion, or who was present whenever he was
asked, John gave his frank, unadulterated opin-
ion. Working with John was a great experience
for me and reinforced one of Jay’s rules, i.e.,
our job was to give our best advice, not to worry
about how it might be received.
I remember one time when John took me
with him to a meeting with the CNO, Admiral
Arleigh Burke, and three or four other senior ad-
mirals. The CNO explained that someone had
proposed building floating intercontinental bal-
listic missile (ICBM) pods with small nuclear re-
actors to plant in the arctic ice. The reactor
would melt the ice and power a small propul-
sion unit that would make the pod slowly move
randomly throughout the ice pack so that it
could not be targeted by the Soviets. He asked
John for his opinion whether the Navy should
investigate the program further. Johns’ response
was that it was the type of thing the Navymight
consider, ‘‘a missile that would fire through its
own ice hole.’’ The meeting abruptly broke up
with uproars of laughter and the subject never
arose again!
I started out with John mentoring me and
working with him, and then I moved over to
theAirWarfareDivision. Iwas there only a short
time until Jay sent me to the field. When I re-
ported to OEG, it was explained that it would
likely be two years before I would be given
a field assignment. For all new analysts, a field
assignment with the Navy was considered to
be highly desirable. I was very fortunate to get
my first assignment after only eight months,
not because of anything I had done or demon-
strated as an analyst, but because a field analyst
had developed a health problem.
Bob Sheldon: Did your mentor at OEG help
you pick up technical skills?
Phil DePoy: No, but each year, some faculty
members from MIT came to OEG to give an
orientation in some technical areas, such as
statistics, mathematical programming, search
theory, etc. They stressed that we were not ex-
pected to be expert in these areas, but they
wanted us to identify an application when we
encountered something for which it could be
used. If it was a simple application, we would
be able to do it; if it was a more complex appli-
cation, we could seek help from others.
Bob Sheldon: What was your first field
assignment?
Phil DePoy: I was sent to Air Development
Squadron Five (VX-5) in China Lake, California,
in February 1960 and spent a year there. VX-5
was the Navy’s tactical evaluation and develop-
ment squadron that tested new attack aircraft
and weapons and developed tactics for their
use. I was also assigned on a part-time basis to
VX-4 in Point Mugu, California, which had the
same responsibilities for fighter aircraft and
weapons. I was sent to San Diego for pressure
chamber and ejection seat training during my
first week in China Lake, and thereafter I was
encouraged to fly a great deal in tactical aircraft,
which was a wonderful experience. Frequently
on weekends, a Marine test pilot would take
me up in a jet trainer (an F9F-8T) and demon-
strate the various tactics we were developing.
Hewould haveme fly the tactics myself in order
to better understand the difficulties. He also
taught me how to get out of a spin—a lesson I
neither wanted nor enjoyed. I was a terrible pi-
lot but learned a lot about how difficult it was to
fly some of the tactics.
At the time, the Michelson Laboratory at
China Lake was working on a new class of con-
ventional weapons, including some that were
guided. Since VX-5 was designing tactics for
the new weapons, the director of the laboratory
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arranged for the program directors for each of
the weapon systems to give me a detailed brief-
ing on the design and status of their system.
These discussions proved to be very valuable
to me in my work at VX-5 but even more valu-
able a few years later!
One of my first efforts at VX-5 involved
ways to increase the range of A-4 aircraft when
delivering nuclear weapons. I was convinced
that using a ‘‘cruise-climb’’ would provide an
increase in range compared to flying to the tar-
get at a constant altitude. A ‘‘cruise-climb’’ is
made by flying at a constant indicated Mach
number so that the aircraft slowly climbs to
a higher altitude as fuel is consumed and its
weight is reduced. The A-4 was a single-seat air-
plane that had an air control system that could
fly the aircraft at a fixed altitude, but did not
have a mode that would fly at a fixed indicated
Mach number. The pilot in a single-seat aircraft
is very busywith navigation and other tasks (es-
pecially over enemy territory), and the VX-5 pi-
lots were convinced that they would use less
fuel in the fixed altitude mode because they
could fly it in a more precise way than trying
to keep a constant indicated Mach number
when their attention was frequently diverted.
A few weeks after I presented my idea, I
was flying to the East Coast in the back seat of
an F9F-8T. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot told
me that he had work to do, so I should fly the
aircraft to Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.
(I later learned that this had been planned
among the squadron pilots for several days.)
He also told me that we needed to fly
a ‘‘cruise-climb’’ since we wouldn’t have much
fuel when we reached Tinker. For the next cou-
ple hours, we were all over the sky while I was
fumbling with maps and trying to keep the air-
craft on-course and at an indicated Mach num-
ber. (Thankfully, flights were not within the
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration—air
traffic control area in that part of the country
during that era.) Finally, the pilot interceded
when we were about 60 miles from the airfield
and had very little fuel remaining. He soon real-
ized that he hadwaited a bit too long and had to
declare an emergency. Tinker replied that they
had a B-52 in emergency status as well and that
we should hold our altitude until further notice.
When we were finally cleared to land, the pilot
put the aircraft in a very steep dive and man-
aged to reach the runway before the engine
flamed out. The engine did shut down when
wewere on the taxiway, andwe had to be towed
the remainder of the way to the parking area.
This story was passed throughout the entire
Navy aviation community within hours, and I
was reminded of it many times over the next de-
cade or so.
I have never forgotten my first exposure to
aircraft carriers while I was at VX-5. The annual
Tailhook meeting was scheduled to be held in
San Diego, and some of the pilots decided that
I should attend. In those days, you had to ac-
tually land an aircraft on a carrier to qualify
for attendance, so they arranged for me to ac-
company some of them to a carrier operating off
San Diego to evaluate some new piece of equip-
ment aboard ship. Although they were board-
ing the carrier in port, they arranged for me to
fly aboard the next day in a COD aircraft (carrier
onboard delivery). I was to fly in the copilot’s
seat and have my hands on the controls (very
lightly), and they felt that would be adequate
to qualify. When the time came, I boarded the
aircraft at North Island, and we flew a couple
hundred miles out to the carrier. When we were
cleared to land, we were advised to follow
a Navy fighter aircraft. As we entered the land-
ing pattern a fewmiles from the ship, I spotted it
and was apprehensive that we were going to
land the large aircraft on such a small deck. As
we were making the final turn toward the car-
rier, I saw the fighter and was watching his final
approach. Hewas a bit lowwhen he reached the
ship, struck the fantail, and exploded. Our pilot
pulled up and flew directly over the wreckage,
which was still burning. We were then directed
to another carrier about 50 miles away to land
and wait until the deck was cleared. At this
point, I was more than apprehensive—I had
seen one landing and it didn’t endwell.Weman-
aged to land on the other carrier, and then a cou-
ple hours later, returned to the one which we
were trying to reach. So I ended up with twice
the number of landings that were required!
I loved my assignments at VX-4 and VX-5.
Working with aviators was a great experience,
and my timing was perfect since the Navy was
beginning to transition from a nuclear mission,
for which the principle mission of aircraft
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carriers was the delivery of nuclear weapons, to
one employing conventional weapons includ-
ing both guided and unguided systems. I had
been able to work on issues related to both nu-
clear and conventional missions. Near the end
of my one-year assignment, I asked Steinhardt
for an extension, but he rejected it. As I recall,
I left China Lake exactly 365 days after I arrived.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go next?
Phil DePoy: I went back to Washington in
1961, and Steinhardt assigned me to a small
OEG division, the Naval Warfare Analysis
Group (NAVWAG), which worked with the
Navy’s Long-Range Objectives Group in the
Pentagon. The director of the Long-Range Ob-
jectives Group was Rear Admiral Tom Moorer,
who was later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Admiral Moorer’s division consisted of
a senior civil servant, two Navy captains, a chief
petty officer, and five or six NAVWAG analysts.
I was assigned to work on two studies, one with
three other analysts, to analyze the concept of
a small aircraft carrier using tilt-wing aircraft
to deliver Marines ashore (which more or less
led to the development of the V-22 aircraft and
LPH [landing platform helicopter] ships). My
other assignment was to assist the aviation staff
to develop the loadout, i.e., the quantity of each
of the new conventional weapons on carriers. In
this study, I worked with the Aviation Division
in the Office of the CNO and with the new Sys-
tems Analysis Division in the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense. I also had the experience of
giving avery short briefing to SecretaryMcNamara
concerning the loadout study.
Bob Sheldon: What were your insights from
that loadout study?
Phil DePoy: If I had the experience that I
gained in the next decade at that time, I would
have approached it very differently. We consid-
ered several possible conflicts in Southeast Asia
and the Middle East and examined the types
and relative frequencies of targets that might
be encountered. We then selected the best
weapon for each type of target and determined
the relative requirements for each type of
weapon. What I quickly learned three or four
years later is that we didn’t know the effective-
ness of weapons against specific targets very ac-
curately; we didn’t know howwell the weapons
could be delivered in different weather and
defense environments; we didn’t know what
countermeasures the enemymay develop against
some weapon types; we didn’t know how fre-
quently pilots would be ordered to attack an al-
ternate target after they’re launched; and there
are many other factors that are unpredictable.
Many of these uncertainties increase the require-
ments for general-purpose weapons, which is
what was quickly learned in Laos and Vietnam.
Bob Sheldon: What did you do next?
Phil DePoy: In 1963, Admiral Moorer was
promoted and became the Commander of the
US Seventh Fleet in the Far East. He suggested
to Jay Steinhardt that I be sent to Seventh Fleet
for my next field assignment. So after a few
months at Stanford to complete more of my the-
sis work, we moved to Japan. I was initially
assigned to the Commander of the Carrier Task
Force, then Rear Admiral Tom South, aboard the
USS Kitty Hawk. Again, I was fortunate that my
timing was good. When I arrived, the carriers
were still assigned the nuclear mission, so the
fleet conducted a lot of large air defense and
antisubmarine warfare exercises, and one of the
two of us (I and my colleague, Ed Vogt, who
was the advisor to Fleet Commander) evaluated
each of them. For analysts, the nuclear mission
of the carriers presented many opportunities.
In the Far East and in the Mediterranean, the
carrier battle groups had specific operating
areas and assigned targets, so they were on alert
all the time. They constantly conducted exer-
cises (ranging from small tests that involved
a single sensor operator to exercises that in-
volved large numbers of ships and aircraft).
There was a lot of data generated continuously
and a great deal of interest of the admirals in
the readiness of both systems and people. Some
of the exercises involved evaluations that were
examined at higher levels of command; if the
ship or task group didn’t perform adequately,
it could be replaced and ordered back to the
States.
One of my first experiences with evaluated
exercises occurred within a couple weeks of
my arrival. One day, Commander Don Engen
learned that I was aboard and came to see me.
(I had met Don previously in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, where he was preparing to set
a low altitude speed record with the new F-4
Phantom aircraft. He was later successful, and
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his record stood for several decades.) (Don was
then the Operations Officer of the carrier.) He
said that the ship was required to perform an
evaluation of its electronic warfare systems,
and they needed a Chief Observer to oversee
the test and report the results directly to an ad-
miral in San Diego. I was pleased to be asked
and agreed to take on the responsibility. Don
assigned six sailors to me as data collectors
and gave me the official instruction for conduct-
ing and evaluating the test. I worked with the
sailors for a couple days to ensure that they
knewwhat data to collect and prepared the data
collection forms. The test took several hours,
and I spent a few days analyzing the results. I
completed the forms from the instruction and
sent them to San Diego.
About a week later, Don and the Captain of
the ship barged into theWar Room and screamed
atme that I had ruined their careers! It turned out
that the ship’s scores were below the minimum
permitted by the Navy, and they had been told
that they had to complete the test at a passing
level within one week or the ship and its escorts
would be returned to the States, to be replaced
by another carrier and its escorts. So I spent sev-
eral days with Don and some of his officers to en-
sure that the results of the next test were above
the threshold. After several rehearsals, they
passed with flying colors. Fortunately, Don and
I soon became friends again, and we worked to-
gethermany times during the rest of hisNaval ca-
reer (he retired as a senior admiral) and later
when hewas the administrator of the FAA. It took
several years before he was able to laugh about
my first experience as a Chief Observer, but then
he not only told many people but also exagger-
ated how poorly I had done!
Bob Sheldon: How was it being aboard ship,
since you were a civilian?
Phil DePoy: One of the unusual things of
that era was that there were no other civilians
assigned to Navy ships. The OEG representa-
tive aboard the Flagship and I were the only
two civilians in the entire Seventh Fleet. Later,
during the Vietnam War, many technical repre-
sentatives from industry were assigned to ships
to maintain many of the complex weapon sys-
tems and other shipborne hardware. This prac-
tice continues to the present day, so the presence
of civilians is no longer an unusual event.
When I first arrived with the Carrier Task
Force, the Commander, Admiral South, made
me a proposition. He suggested that for the first
two months with him I not join his Flag Mess
(which was usual for the OEG representatives),
but rather eat in the Officers’ Mess. He had
asked the ship’s Executive Officer (who had been
the ExecutiveOfficer at VX-4when Iworkedwith
them) to seat me at his table with the ship depart-
ment heads, and tomoveme everyweek so that I
sat next to another department head. During that
week, the Admiral wanted me to spend half my
time with that officer and the remainder of my
timeworkingwith his staff. It was an amazing ex-
perience! I learned so much that when my two
months were up, I asked the Admiral if I could
continue the process, repeating the entire cycle.
He turned down my request and moved me to
his Flag Mess, saying that he had predicted that
Iwouldwant todo that! (Years later, I learned that
Admirals South and Moorer had developed this
plan together.)
My tour with the Carrier Task Force turned
out to be the most valuable nine months of my
entire career in OEG. Initially, I was involved
with exercises, including planning a very large
exercise that would involve five attack carriers,
three ASW (antisubmarine warfare) carriers,
and loads of other forces. Unfortunately, the
massive exercise had to be cancelled at the last
minute due to developments in Southeast Asia.
(There was a several week build-up in which
daily made-up ‘‘intelligence’’ messages were
sent to all the participants based on the scenario
chosen for the exercise. With the rapidly chang-
ing political situation in Southeast Asia, actual
intelligencemessages were being confusedwith
the exercise ones, and the Fleet Commander de-
cided that the exercise would have to be can-
celled.) However, I was able to design and
work on a very interesting set of exercises to
evaluate a new command and control system,
the new Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS),
which was installed on a carrier, theUSSOriskany,
and two escort ships. The NTDS battle group
had earlier deployed to the Seventh Fleet
soon after the NTDS had been installed but en-
countered problems with the system and was
unable to fully evaluate it. (One of my good
friends in OEG, Erv Kapos, FS, had worked with
the NTDS in San Diego so I knew a lot about the
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system from reading his reports). The Admiral
aboard the Oriskany was Rear Admiral Fred
(Dick) Ashworth, who had been assigned to
Los Alamos during World War II and was in
the aircraft bomb bay with the weapon that
was dropped on Nagasaki. We had many inter-
esting conversations about nuclear warfare and
were able to visit the museum in Hiroshima to-
gether. (An interesting side note: When we ar-
rived at the museum, the Admiral was stopped
at the door and was not permitted to enter the
main part of the museum, so he waited for me
and one of his officers in his staff car. The Japa-
nese explained to us that they felt it would be
too traumatic for him to see some of the dis-
plays. It was later reported in the US press that
he was not permitted to visit in retaliation for
his role at Nagasaki.) In order to evaluate the
NTDS, we designed two separate exercises—one
with the Oriskany Battle Group and the second
with another carrier battle group. We used the
same simulated raid structure against both battle
groups and were able to estimate the improve-
ment in effectiveness that NTDS provided.
About half-way through my assignment,
President Kennedy was assassinated. We re-
ceived notice in the middle of the night to stand
by for an elevation of DEFCON (defense readi-
ness condition) since it was not yet known
who was involved in the assassination. The Ad-
miral met immediately with four of his senior
staff members and me. He ordered that weapons
be loaded and the pilots be briefed on their
assigned targets under the guise of exercises
which we frequently conducted. Only the six
of us knew that this time it might be real. I
learned a lot about leadership, observing the
way the Admiral handled the situation. Al-
though I had thought about the nuclear evolu-
tion a lot, I suddenly recognized parts of the
operation which I had never considered. After
visiting the deck to see how the weapon loading
was going (it was sobering to watch many one-
megaton nuclear weapons rolling past when I
realized that this time it was not a drill!) and vis-
iting one or two ready rooms to see how far
along theywerewith their pilot briefings, I went
to my desk and thought through the entire pro-
cess of launching an attack to determine if there
were things that might go wrong. It suddenly
occurred to me that I had never thought about
the ‘‘enemy.’’ We often had Soviet nuclear sub-
marines in our vicinity, and I began to think
how theymight react if they had been forewarned
that an attack was imminent. When a carrier pre-
pares to launch aircraft, one of the last steps is to
turn the ship (and its escorts) into the wind and
to accelerate in order to maximize the wind over
the deck. That could have caused the subma-
rines to attack. So I developed a plan to turn
the ship into the wind as soon as possible, but
not to accelerate it since the task group fre-
quently turns and this, by itself, would not nec-
essarilymean that a launchwas imminent. I also
developed a plan to use twoASWescorts to trap
submarines if they were following us. I took my
plan to the Admiral, and fortunately, about that
time we were told to stand down since it had
been determined that the Soviets were not in-
volved with the assassination. (I never dis-
cussed my plan further with the Admiral so
never learned if he agreed with it.) The next
morning, the Admiral announced the Presi-
dent’s death on the ship intercom, and I don’t
believe that anyone on the ship connected the
night’s events with the assassination. In fact,
many (including the ship’s captain) complained
for days about having to get up in the middle of
the night to conduct ‘‘exercises.’’
I was embarrassed by the fact that I had
never thought about the particular issue of vul-
nerability when preparing to launch aircraft. If
Jay were still the Director of OEG, I would prob-
ably have been part of that year’s ‘‘six percent’’
(the group that departed involuntarily), but he
had left two years earlier when OEG became
part of the newly created Center for Naval An-
alyses (CNA), andwewere no longer sponsored
by MIT. (I would probably have shot myself to
avoid telling Jay!)
Bob Sheldon: What did you consider your
biggest impact during that field tour?
Phil DePoy:One of the most valuable contri-
butions I made to the Navy during that period
came about soon after the assassination—and I
was only the messenger! One day I received
a call from a Navy Warrant Officer, Max Gunn,
asking me to meet him in the Officers’ Mess for
coffee because he needed to discuss something
with me. I had first met Max in China Lake dur-
ing my VX-5 assignment. He was assigned to
the Laboratory and was, without a doubt, the
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most knowledgeable ordnance person I had
ever met. The squadron would often call him
for advice.When Iwas spendingmy two-month
‘‘orientation tour’’ on the carrier, I had seen him
a few times in the weapons spaces. When I met
him that day in the mess, he told me that he had
heard a lot of rumors about the possibility of
war in Southeast Asia, and he was very con-
cerned about the carrier’s readiness for assem-
bling and loading conventional weapons. He
explained tome that the ordnancemen had very
little experience with the new types of weapons
aboard the carrier. But even worse, during war-
time weapons had to be assembled by sailors of
all types on the mess decks and that the trained
ordnance men had to load the weapons on the
aircraft. He said there were no sailors trained
to do the assembly, and the ordnance men had
little experience loading conventional weapons.
We talked about how we might be able to train
the sailors, and he had several ideas. I went back
to my desk and looked up the regulations. I
found that there was a regulation against fuzing
and loading ordnance on an aircraft, and then
removing it from the aircraft and disassembling
it. So I met with Admiral South and suggested
that we ask for relief from the regulation and
conduct a test in which we break out a variety
of ordnance to load 10 aircraft. We would ran-
domly select a group of sailors to assemble the
weapons, and I would time the entire evolution.
The Admiral consented immediately, and I pre-
pared a message for him to send to Washington
seeking the waiver. I worked with the Warrant
Officer to plan the entire drill, and when the
waiver was received a few days later, we were
ready to go. I won’t go into all the details, but
the exercise was a total fiasco. We had weapon
parts spread from one end of the carrier to the
other, some weapons loaded without fuzes,
and others that couldn’t be loaded at all. The
Admiral immediately ordered the ship, as well
as the other two carriers in Seventh Fleet, to be-
gin immediate and intense training for the as-
sembly and loading of conventional ordnance.
It was a godsend, because only a few weeks
later, we were delivering conventional ord-
nance for real!
Soon after our ordnance circus, the Navy
andAir Forcewere ordered tomake some small,
but very highly classified, strikes into Laos.
Because of the sensitivity of the attacks, we
weren’t able to use Air Wing officers to plan
the strikes, so I was heavily involved in much
of the planning. There was an element of com-
petition between the Air Force and the Navy
in Washington over who would be selected for
each individual strike, so it was important that
each attack be successful. In one of the first
strikes, I insisted on at least 12 aircraft in order
to have a high likelihood of success. The Air
Force offered to do it with only four aircraft so
naturally it was selected by the JCS (Joint Chiefs
of Staff). I assured everyone that the Air Force
wouldn’t be successful, but theymanaged to de-
stroy the target with the first two aircraft! My
reputation as a strike planner was badly dam-
aged, but in time, I learned that the Air Force
Squadron Commander was ‘‘encouraged’’ by
the Air Force Chief of Staff (General Curtis
Lemay) on the phone before takeoff, and that
he and his Executive Officer attacked first, the
Executive Officer being instructed to take out
the target with his wing if the Commanding
Officer missed the target. They both released
well below the minimum altitude, and both air-
craft were heavily damaged by fragments from
the weapons. Although I never knew, I exagger-
ated the story a bit and told everyone later that
both aircraft were probably totally destroyed, in
order to partially restore my reputation as
a strike planner.
Even with this failure, I was tasked to pre-
pare a plan for a series of strikes which the
JCS had assigned to the Navy. The Admiral
planned to fly to Japan to present it to Admiral
Moorer and the Deputy Commander of the Pa-
cific Fleet who was flying out from Hawaii. I
prepared the plan and presented it to the Admi-
ral in detail on the afternoon before he planned
to fly off the ship at 10:00 p.m. in order to be in
Yokosuka in the earlymorning. After dinner, the
Admiral called me aside and said that he had
decided that he should stay on the ship because
of some operations that were going on, and that
I should take the plans to Yokosuka. He sug-
gested that I stay there for an extra day since
my son had been born nearly two months ear-
lier and I had only seen him once (on the day af-
ter his birth). That night turned out to be one of
the most harrowing trips of my life. To start, we
were on the catapult as scheduled at 10:00 pm. I
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was riding in an A-3 aircraft with my back to
the pilot. The A-3 also carried a bombardier/
navigator who sat next to the pilot. The pilot
was theA-3 SquadronCommander, Commander
Walter Carlin, who had been at VX-5 with me
several years earlier. Walt asked us if we were
ready for launch, then applied full power to
the engines. I couldn’t see the Launch Officer
so was waiting to feel the impact of the catapult.
Out of the corner of my eye, I noticed a flashing
red light (which wasn’t a good sign). Walt sud-
denly said that we had a problem and might be
‘‘going in’’ (i.e., into the water). About that time,
one of the engines started shedding blades, so I
could imagine that nothing good was going to
happen in the next few seconds. After a wait
that seemed like hours, the steam was success-
fully bled off the catapult, and Walt was able
to shut down the remaining engine. It turned
out that an alert sailor had seen something
ingested into an engine and immediately hit
the alarm. In typical Navy fashion, no one (other
than me) seemed particularly alarmed by this
near-miss, and we were told that another air-
craft would be ready in 45 minutes. I changed
flight suits since I was soaking wet, and climbed
into the other aircraft. This time the launch was
without incident, and we climbed to altitude
over the South China Sea. Within 30 minutes af-
ter launch, we suddenly felt a sharp jolt like we
had struck something. No one said anything,
but in a minute or so, we had another jolt. Then
it continued every minute or so. Walt finally
spoke and said that it appeared that we had
a problem in the control system so ‘‘just in case’’
he was going to declare an emergency. He did
so, and immediately the nearest control center
(in Okinawa) responded. I still remember their
call sign—it was ‘‘Tree Frog.’’ I also remember
the A-3’s plane number and loads of other de-
tails that I’d not normally noticed. Tree Frog
said that they were launching a rescue helicop-
ter. That didn’t reassure me at all because I knew
we were several hundred miles from Okinawa.
Then Walt opened the lower escape hatch and
told me that when he said to leave, I should go
first. I looked out the hatch and realized that
the South China Sea was about six miles or so
below us and there were a lot of sea snakes
waiting for us to come down. I doubted that
I would have the nerve to leave the plane,
but fortunately I never had tomake the decision.
The jolts continued, but Walt decided that he
was able to hold altitude and would continue
to Japan because I needed to be there by morn-
ing. I would have preferred to land at the first
airfield we encountered but didn’t want to be
the one to suggest it. My problems didn’t end
there; when we arrived in Japan, the airbase
hadn’t received the message to have transporta-
tion to take me to Yokosuka, so I ended up on
a series of Japanese trains starting at 5:00 in
the morning. Fortunately, the briefing went
well, and I was able to see my new son.
Bob Sheldon: Did you work with other OEG
folks during that field tour?
Phil DePoy: Soon after my thrilling flight to
Japan, a new OEG analyst (Howard Kreiner,
a long-experienced and outstanding analyst) ar-
rived and I moved to the Fleet Flagship. I had
planned some exercises I thought the fleet
should conduct and was anxious to deliver
them to the Admiral. (Admiral Moorer had re-
cently departed and had been succeeded byAd-
miral Roy Johnson). I never had the chance to
discuss them with the Admiral because other
events always took priority. Soon after I arrived
on the Flagship, the Gulf of Tonkin attacks oc-
curred. The morning after the second attack on
our two destroyers, the Legal Officer, the Read-
iness Officer, and I flew by helicopter to the de-
stroyers and one of the carriers that launched
aircraft during the incident.
The Legal Officer took custody of the radar,
sonar, and navigation logs from each of the de-
stroyers, and he and I reconstructed the attack.
After we completed the reconstruction, one of
the senior staff officers from the Seventh Fleet
staff took them to Manila to show to a UN dele-
gation. After he left, I was looking at our recon-
struction and suddenly realized that the radar
detections of the PT boats were made well be-
yond the radar horizon. Again, I knew Steinhardt
would have fired me if he found that I had not
immediately noticed that fact. I immediately
sent a message to CNA to check with the Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Fleet Nu-
merical Meteorology and Oceanography Cen-
ter to determine if it was possible that we
had had radar ducting at the frequencies of
the surface search radars that evening in the
Tonkin Gulf. I had a few anxious hours before
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hearing that it was highly likely that we had
ducting that night.
Despite the opinion of many people that the
attack did not occur, I can say with absolute cer-
tainty that it occurred. However, it might be
questioned whether an attack by two small PT
boats warranted a full-scale war with an un-
countable number of deaths.
After the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, Howard
and I were consumed for a while with strike
planning. Most of the Navy strike planners
had very little training and experience with con-
ventional weapon planning. So Howard and I
traveled independently from carrier to carrier
helping them, and in some cases, training offi-
cers to do conventional strike planning. There
were no documents about strike planning with
the newer types of weapons, so Howard and I
decided that I should write one. I spent the next
month writing the document and sending mes-
sages back to CNA’s computer center to run
models to predict weapon effectiveness against
various types of targets. Finally, on New Year’s
Eve, I finished the document. We had 50 copies
of the handbook printed, and they were flown
directly to the carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin
the next day.
There was an interesting follow-up to this
project that field analysts sometimes encoun-
tered in those days when we had very limited
communications with the home office. (There
were also many advantages to having limited
delays in communications. We could do just
about anything we wanted and then apologize
for it later.) About a month later, the Flagship
was in port in Yokosuka, Japan, and I had flown
down to southern Japan for a day to visit an-
other ship. When I returned the next morning,
the officer whose desk was next to mine told
me that my boss had been on the Flagship the
previous day and said that he was there to fire
me. (Only two months before proofing this in
July 2015, I gave the eulogy at that officer’s
funeral—he was the last living multiple Navy
Cross winner, having won two Navy Crosses
inWorldWar II when hewas 19 years old!) Since
that officer often joked with me, I thought he
was doing just that, and I made some crack
about hoping that someone would fire me and
get me off the ship! Within a few minutes, the
Admiral’s orderly appeared and asked me to
go to the Admiral’s office. As I then learned,
an analyst in the OEG Washington office had
been writing a weaponeering manual for sev-
eral months; hewas naturally upset to learn that
I had alreadywritten anddistributed such a thing
in Seventh Fleet. He convinced the Director
of OEG that my manual was inferior to his
and that I should be fired. So our director had
flown to Japan and went aboard the Flagship
to meet with Admiral Johnson. Unfortunately,
he started out by apologizing to the Admiral
about my manual and told him that I would
be replaced. The Admiral immediately had
him escorted off the ship by two large sailors,
told him to be out of the country within 24
hours, and then wrote a message to the CNO
and the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces
telling them what had occurred. The Admiral
explained all of this to me and said that I
shouldn’t worry because the Navy would pro-
tect me. I explained that my paycheck was
signed by the guy whom he had thrown off
the ship, but it didn’t seem to concern him. I
learned several weeks later that the director
had entered the OEG office on his first day back
inWashington and immediately started scream-
ing for the analyst who had convinced him to
visit me. (That analyst got even with me in later
years. He died after surgery, and I then learned
that he had appointed me as the executor of his
estate!)
I also have a sea story about Howard
Kreiner. During the Gulf of Tonkin incident
and for several months thereafter, he and I were
the only twoOEG analysts in the Seventh Fleet. I
was on the Flagship with the Fleet Commander
and Howard was on one of the carriers with the
Carrier Task Force Commander, so we fre-
quently communicated but didn’t see each
other very often.
As I mentioned earlier, for a week or so im-
mediately after the Gulf of Tonkin incident,
Howard and I started going from carrier to
carrier—not together, but to different carriers—
helping them with strike planning. After we had
worked with all the carriers for a week or so,
we arranged to meet back aboard the Fleet Flag-
ship in order to compare notes and decide what
we should do next. When we arrived on the
Flagship, we were told that there was a Naval
message for us from CNA. We assumed that
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they were worried about us or wanted to send
help or something, so we retrieved the message
from the communications center. It turned out
to be a notice that sincewewere now in a combat
zone, CNA had to cancel our life insurance.
We were both very angry, and Howard de-
cided to resign. He wrote a message to CNA ei-
ther resigning or at least threatening to resign.
Then we started thinking about how to get
him off the ship, because the Navy certainly
had no responsibility to transport him if he
was no longer a CNA employee. The only thing
we could come up with was to borrow a small
boat with oars and start rowing. We joked that
we might be able to get ashore and set up an
OR group for the North Vietnamese. One of
the staff officers quipped that we could prob-
ably do more for the US Navy by advising
the enemy.
Some other interesting experiences in Sev-
enth Fleet occurred when the JCS decided that
it would be a great signal to the Viet Cong if
we took the Seventh Fleet Flagship, a cruiser (!),
up the river through theMekongDelta to down-
town Saigon. I’m certain that no ship even half
the size of the Flagship had ever made it to
Saigon. In any case, with a Vietnamese ship’s pi-
lot (who we hoped wasn’t a member of the Viet
Cong) to guide us, many US Marines with rifles
behind sandbags on the deck, and a continuous
flow of armed aircraft diving at us, we made it
all the way to Saigon where we stayed for sev-
eral days. The day we were leaving Saigon, Ad-
miral Johnson called me into his office and told
me that he wanted me to leave the ship, fly to
Okinawa by commercial air, board the amphib-
ious command ship, and observe an amphibi-
ous exercise which was scheduled to start in
three days. I hurriedly packed my bags and
went to the airport. I was not able to get a reser-
vation on a commercial flight until the next day
so went back into town and stayed overnight at
a hotel. The next day I arrived at the airport, and
when they checked my passport, the immigra-
tion official noticed that I had not officially
checked into the country. They immediately
arrested me and said that I would need to sum-
mon aUS Consular Officer to come to the airport.
(This had happened to me twice before. I had
previously encountered the same problem in
Manila and Taiwan. Our ship was supposed to
notify the country that a civilian was onboard
before they arrived, but having only one aboard
they never remembered. I learned inManila that
I should not let the US Embassy know about
my problem (the US Consular Officer had sug-
gested that I find someone to smuggle me out
of the country). I called the British Embassy
(which I had done in Manila because my wife
was a British citizen), and they solved the prob-
lem within an hour, and I was able to board my
flight. I arrived in Okinawa and took a taxi to
White Beach, the port where US ships anchored.
(White Beach is one of the best ports in South-
east Asia; it is very large and almost fully pro-
tected by land. There’s only a small entrance
to it from the sea.)
It was about 3:00 p.m. on a Saturday when I
arrived at the port. I loved the US Officers’ Club
at White Beach and thought I would stay ashore
and have dinner there. Unfortunately, I decided
to go to the ship and leave my bags first, so I
called the ship and they sent the Admiral’s
barge to get me. Ten minutes after I arrived on
the ship, there was an announcement that all
boating had been cancelled due to rough seas,
so I was trapped. I met with the Admiral and
his aide and had dinner with them in the Admi-
ral’s quarters. Several times while we were hav-
ing dinner and a later discussion about the
exercise, the staff meteorologist came in and
briefed the Admiral about the weather. Each
time, the wind had risen since his previous visit,
but each time he assured the Admiral that it had
reached its peak. The aide mentioned that they
were showing a movie in the ship Officers’
Mess, so I excused myself and finally found
the Mess. There were only six or seven officers
there because everyone else was at the Officers’
Club—where I wished I had stayed. During the
movie, I noticed that the ship was rolling more
and more, and suddenly the lights went out,
and the ‘‘general quarters’’ alarm was sounded.
Over the speaker, someone was yelling ‘‘colli-
sion, collision, port side’’ over and over. All
the officers ran out and tried to find their way
to their stations in the dark. I heard one of them
fall down a ladder, and he was crying out in
pain (it turned out that he broke a leg). I decided
to stay in my seat since I couldn’t remember
even the direction of the entrance to the Mess.
For a long period, all sorts of announcements
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were coming and suddenly there was a jolt and
the ship rolled much further than it had previ-
ously. This turned out to be a collision with
a ship that was dragging anchor. Then the an-
nouncement changed to ‘‘damage control party
to bow, port side.’’ With that announcement, I
decided that I was going to die, and the divers
would find me several days later and think I
had stayed in place waiting for the remainder
of the movie. It probably took the better part
of an hour to restore some power, and I could
find my way to the Admiral’s quarters. When
I arrived, the Admiral was in the process of or-
dering all ships to leave the port at first light
(which was six or seven hours away). I learned
that there were at least two ships aground, and
we were going to have to wait until daylight to
fully assess the damage to our ship. I assumed
we were taking on water because they sealed
off the front section of the ship. The next day,
we were able to limp out of the port and it
was determined that we would have to sail
to the Philippines for repair, even though we
only had a skeleton crew on board. So we
limped slowly to the Philippines, which took
more than a week. It was the most boring time
of my life. I think I read every book in the
ship’s small library. (Over the next year, I
was interviewed at least three times by Navy
lawyers.)
While I was in in the Seventh Fleet, I had
several meetings with the British ‘‘Fleet Scientist’’
attached to the British Far East Fleet home-
ported in Singapore. Peter Rose was exactly
like I pictured Blackett. At one time, Peter
had been an academic, a physics professor,
and had joined Blackett’s group sometime after
World War II. He was an outstanding analyst
and became a good friend.Whenever the British
carrier came to the Tonkin Gulf, Admiral John-
son would receive a personal message from
the British Admiral saying ‘‘My Fleet Scientist
desires to meet with your Fleet Scientist.’’ Ad-
miral Johnson loved to respond, ‘‘My Fleet Sci-
entist accepts his invitation.’’ I had explained
to everyone on the staff that I wanted to always
meet with Peter on the British carrier since they
served drinks before dinner. Peter always wore
a British Naval uniform with shorts. All the of-
ficers on the US staff thought that I should wear
shorts when I visited Peter.
The remainder of my tour in Seventh Fleet
was busy with strike planning and analysis of
strike results. Several years earlier, the Air Force
had developed a very detailed simulation of the
SA-2 surface-to-air missile and concluded that
therewas almost no chance of an aircraft surviv-
ing at an altitude above 2,000 feet or more, and
that the only way to survive against the missile
was to attack at low altitude, below the radar
line of sight. So when the Vietnam War started,
the delivery tactics were all designed to stay
low—below 2,000 feet—and both the Air Force
and the Navy lost a lot of planes to gunfire.
The pilots on their own, without the benefit of
a simulation, worked out ways to defeat the
SA-2 at higher altitudes. Analysts in both the
Navy and Air Force had used the simulation
without considering the effectiveness of guns.
Nearly all the aircraft losses in the early stages
of the war were due to gunfire. Pilots had a lot
of incentive to improve tactics and were able
to develop maneuvers which would greatly re-
duce the effectiveness of the missiles and allow
them to operate at altitudes where guns were
not effective. So it took several months to figure
out, but they changed their tactics and lost
fewer aircraft per sortie for the remainder of
the war.
One ofmy actions in Seventh Fleet that gave
the most people knowledge about OEG was
prompted by a discussion with the Fleet Legal
Officer. I was complaining to him about the fact
that there was amidnight curfew for all military
personnel throughout the Western Pacific. He
pointed out that I wasn’t subject to the curfew
because I was a civilian. He typed out a state-
ment for me to read to the shore patrol if they
questioned me. The statement was simply ‘‘I
am a civilian and hence I am not subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.’’ I was so
pleased with my new power that I used it many
times—even if I only stayed ashore an addi-
tional 10 minutes. One day in Hong Kong,
a chief petty officer on the Admiral’s staff came
to me and asked if there were more OEG repre-
sentatives in Seventh Fleet. I said that there was
only one other and hewas on one of the carriers.
The chief petty officer then explained that he
had been on shore patrol duty the previous
night and had found six ‘‘OEG reps’’ in the Hil-
ton bar after curfew. I told him that frequently
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some more ‘‘OEG reps’’ came out to the fleet
and always forgot to let me know. As time went
on, I heardmanymore reports of large groups of
‘‘OEG reps’’ visiting the fleet! Many times,
when I would arrive on a ship for the first time,
everyone would start laughing and say that
they always wanted to meet a ‘‘real OEG rep’’.
Bob Sheldon: What was your next job after
your fleet tour?
Phil DePoy: I returned to Washington in
April 1965 and became director of the OEG
Southeast Asia Analysis Division, relieving
Erv Kapos, who had started the division and
who then moved to Honolulu to establish
and direct the OEG Analysis Division at
Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet. At that
time, we had three or four representatives full-
time in Seventh Fleet, about a dozen in Hawaii,
and from 20 to 25 in Washington working on
various issues related to the Vietnam War. The
work of the Washington division mainly sup-
ported the Office of the CNO, particularly the
Air Analysis Office. The division included up
to 10 Naval officers who were assigned to
CNA, up to six Navy enlisted men who had ad-
vanced degrees in science or engineering, and
eight to 10 OEG civilians.
During this period, I also served as a part-
time analyst in the Air Analysis Division in
the Office of the CNO. I worked on several inter-
esting studies in the latter role. One of these
studies was an analysis of the potential cost
and effectiveness of a fence around the northern
part of South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara
had proposed that a high chain-link fence be
constructed for several hundred miles along
the northern and northwestern borders supple-
mented with land mines. Not surprisingly, we
found that the cost was prohibitive, a multiple
of the US GNP (gross national product) at the
time. Unfortunately, we were never able to brief
Secretary McNamara. The Admiral who di-
rected the study decided that none of the four
of us assigned to the effort should brief Mr.
McNamara and that he wanted a ‘‘professional
briefer.’’ So he requested that one of the briefers
from the office of the Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps be assigned to him. I must admit that
the Marine briefer was good. He had a great
voice and was very professional. We spent sev-
eral days preparing the briefing and working
with him on his presentation. When the day of
the briefing came, the four of us filed into the
briefing room and sat at the very back. Then
the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff filed in
and sat at the table. Finally, Mr. McNamara
and his deputy arrived and sat at the head of
the table. Our Admiral introduced the briefer,
who started out by saying ‘‘SecretaryMcNamara,
Mr. Vance, Generals, and Animals.’’ The entire
group (excluding the Commandant) started
laughing so hard that a few choked. After about
five minutes, things quieted down, and the
briefer tried to start again. But the group would
start laughing againwhenever he spoke. Finally,
Mr. McNamara said that we would have to try
again on another day and left, still laughing.
The others then filed out. Finally, our study
group and the briefer were the only ones left.
That was the last time we saw or heard of the
Marine briefer, and the briefing was never
rescheduled.
Another interesting study that I did was to
determine how many six to eight-month de-
ployments that various types of pilots could
make to Vietnam and have at least a 50 percent
chance of survival based on our projected loss
rates. The results were closely held for a long
time and fortunately loss rates improved. At
that time, the highest loss rates were with the
photo reconnaissance aircraft, and the number
of deployments was approximately 1.0! Be-
tween January 1962 and June 1973, the Navy
and Marine Corps lost 711 fixed-wing aircraft
in combat and an additional 391 operationally.
During this tour in Washington, which
lasted about 20 months, I made two trips to
the Seventh Fleet, each for a month or less.
Bob Sheldon:Did you return to Seventh Fleet
again for a full-length tour after that?
Phil DePoy:No. In January 1967, I moved to
the Sixth Fleet. When I left Washington, I
thought I would be living in Villefranche, lo-
cated between Nice and Monaco, and was look-
ing forward to a pleasant respite from the war
and relaxing on the beach in southern France.
Unfortunately, by the time I arrived in Europe,
I learned that the Fleet Headquarters, which
had been in Villefranche since 1948, was being
moved to Gaeta, Italy, a small coastal village
halfway between Rome and Naples. The Fleet
Commander was Vice Admiral Dick Ashworth,
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with whom I had worked in the Seventh Fleet.
The Admiral had determined that he wanted
both my colleague, Gene Palmour, and me to
be on the Flagship with him and to visit the
two carriers for major exercises. Both Gene
and I preferred that at least one of us be on the
carriers, but the Admiral was persistent. For
the next two months, we worked on some ASW
issues, including an analysis of a recentmajor ex-
ercise. ASW was a major issue in the Mediterra-
nean due to the number of Soviet submarines
that were always present. In March, Vice Admi-
ral Ashworth was replaced by Vice Admiral Bill
Martin, a famous aviator fromWorld War II and
with whom I had worked in Washington when
he was the deputy director of the Aviation Divi-
sion in the Office of the CNO.
Gene and I stayed busy with planning for
a major fleet air defense exercise until late April
when a coup took place in Greece and the Flag-
ship and one carrier battle group were sent to
the area and our exercise had to be postponed.
After the coup had settled down, the Flagship
was sent back to France for a one-week port call
in Villefranche, which we were anxiously antic-
ipating. The day before we arrived in France,
the Admiral aboard one of the carriers asked
that Gene and I spend the week with him to de-
velop some new plans for the air defense exer-
cise which had to be rescheduled. I tried to
convince Admiral Martin that he needed us in
Villefranche, but he explained that he couldn’t
turndowna request for help froma subordinate.
Gene and I were flown to the carrier by helicop-
ter a few hours before the Flagship entered port
and returned to the Flagship a week later imme-
diately after it came back to sea. The Flagship
remained at sea for three more weeks before
returning to Gaeta. We were looking forward
to being home since we had been at sea for
nearly six weeks. We arrived in Gaeta on a Fri-
day and learned that the Director of OEG, Jim
Tyson, was arriving on Saturday morning to
visit us. We spent the weekend with Jim and
on the following Monday, I accompanied him
to the ship for breakfast with the Admiral. Ad-
miral Martin asked Jim how long it had been
since he had been on a carrier, and Jim told
him that it had been many years (Jim had joined
OEG directly fromMIT duringWorldWar II but
hadn’t had a field assignment for more than
a decade). The Admiral immediately called his
aide and told him to arrange an aircraft to fly
Jim and me to the carrier (which was operating
off Naples) for lunch. I protested that I had been
at sea for the past six weeks, but the Admiral as-
suredme that it was only for lunch, and I would
be home in time for dinner. So I drove Jim to
Naples and we boarded our plane to fly to the
carrier.
Jim hadn’t flown aboard a carrier for a long
time so he asked me what he should do to pre-
pare for a carrier landing. I explained that the
COD aircraft was so slow that he wouldn’t even
feel the landing. When we hit the carrier deck, I
thought we had crashed. It was the hardest car-
rier landing that I had ever experienced, includ-
ing many landings in jet aircraft, and we were
both dazed. When we disembarked, Admiral
Geis and his Chief of Staff were waiting for us
on the flight deck. The Admiral apologized for
our hard landing and explained that the ship
had been ordered to go to the Middle East at
high speed and they had to take us aboard fly-
ing downwind, which was the reason the land-
ing felt more like a crash. He also explained that
the shipwould soon be out of range ofNaples so
it would be necessary to launch the aircraft im-
mediately. I was pleased that I wouldn’t have to
stay aboard for lunch when the Admiral added
‘‘Phil, Admiral Martin wants you to stay aboard
with us.’’ I protested that I didn’t have any other
clotheswithme sowould have to come out later,
but he said that they would find clothes for me.
So I watched the plane take off without me and
went to the War Room to find out why we were
headed to the Mideast and to find out where I
was going to find some clothes, a razor, and
a toothbrush and wondered what my wife and
son would think while they were waiting for
me for dinner at home.
I received a message from Admiral Martin
apologizing for my change of plans and telling
me to examine the fleet’s readiness to conduct
strike operations. Over the next two weeks, I
checked on the numbers and types of aircraft
on both carriers and the ordnance on the car-
riers, aboard the only ammunition supply ship
in the area, and in the NATO storage depots. I
didn’t know what targets we might have to
strike or even whom we might be attacking, so
I developed a list of likely targets wherever we
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might be sent. I found some shortages in some
types of ordnance and found that the ordnance
in the depots was not assembled and the parts
were scattered among several locations. I also
examined our defensive issues, particularly in
the waters off Egypt.
Two weeks after the cancelled lunch, the
Fleet Flagship arrived and I was able to return
to what seemed like home. Within days, the
Arab-Israeli Six-Day War started on June 5,
1967, and I felt like I was back in the Gulf of Ton-
kin even though we weren’t conducting strikes.
With two carrier battle groups and some am-
phibious ships, the fleet covered a large area.
Most of the time was spent moving the fleet
back and forth from the coast. The JCSwould or-
der the fleet pulled back from the coast a few
hundred miles, then would order them to close
within two hundred miles, always at high
speed. TheAdmiral’s staff began toworry about
fuel levels on all the ships. Gene and I were
given the task of determining what US-flag
commercial tankers were in the eastern Medi-
terranean and to devise a plan to refuel the fleet
ships. We contacted the OEG representative in
London who was able to provide us the loca-
tions of all the tankers near us, so we were able
to develop a plan, which fortunately never had
to be used.
On June 8, I was sitting in the War Room
with Admiral Martin discussing the air defense
exercise that Gene and I had designed and
hoped to conduct after the war concluded. The
Communications Officer, Ensign Phil Dur (later
an Admiral) rushed over and told Admiral
Martin that we had a ship, ‘‘Rockstar’’ (which
was the code name for the USS Liberty) under
attack. The Admiral, who had a lot of combat
experience in World War II and Korea, calmly
ordered the carriers to launch all the aircraft that
were armed and ready. Within minutes, the USS
America began to launch. Gene and I walked out
onto the open bridge adjoining the War Room
to watch the launch. The Commanding Officer
of the carrier was Captain Don Engen (whom
I mentioned earlier), and I remember waving
at him.
Meanwhile the Air Operations Officer de-
termined that there weren’t enough tanker air-
craft on the two carriers to fuel all the aircraft
that were airborne if they flew all the way to
the Liberty and back. He told the Admiral who
calmly ordered that the aircraft should continue
to the Liberty, which meant that some planes
would end up in the water. Within a short time,
a message arrived from the US Ambassador in
Tel Aviv saying that, ‘‘Israelis believe that they
may have mistakenly attacked a US ship. They
offer their abject apologies.’’ The Admiral read
the message, thought for a short time, and then
ordered the aircraft to return.
The Flagship and carriers then raced to-
ward the heavily damaged Liberty. As soon we
were within helicopter range, Admiral Martin
flew to the damaged ship, and then his helicop-
ter flew back with some of the injured sailors.
Other helicopters began shuttling between the
Liberty, the Flagship, and the carriers with more
wounded sailors. In total, 34 sailors were killed
and 171 seriously injured in the attack.
In this event and many others in the Gulf of
Tonkin, I was very impressed in observing
many admirals under pressure, making life-
and-death decisions which would affect many
people. In the Pacific, I had been with Admirals
South,Weisner, Moorer, Johnson, and Cooper in
many crisis situations. All of them and Admi-
rals Ashworth and Martin had similar back-
grounds. They were all aviators who had
flown a lot of combat missions during World
War II and the Korean War. They all behaved
the same in a serious crisis. They remained very
calm and carefully, but quickly, made decisions.
As a result, nearly everyone around them
remained calm.
After the war, Admiral Martin decided that
I should go to Londonwith one of the officers on
his staff to brief Admiral McCain (John’s father)
on the ordnance issues that I had discovered. As
had been my previous experience with Admiral
McCain, we were able to complete about half of
our briefing before he threw us out of his office.
When I returned to the ship, AdmiralMartin ap-
proved the plan for a series of air defense exer-
cises. A few months before I went to the
Mediterranean, the Navy had conducted a large
study directed by Rear Admiral Zumwalt (later
the CNO) and several analysts from CNA to de-
termine the number of escort ships required to
provide adequate defense of a carrier battle
group. They used large simulation models and
developed a recommendation for the numbers
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of air defense and submarine defense escorts
that were needed for each battle group.
We designed a series of exercises with dif-
ferent numbers of escorts in order to verify the
results of the air defense simulations. We
recorded all the voice nets and the data links.
We even took radiosondemeasurements (via at-
mospheric weather balloons) throughout the
exercises in case radar performance appeared
to vary. When we analyzed the exercise results,
the optimal was between three and four es-
corts with a significant degradation in effec-
tiveness as the number of escorts increased
beyond that. The results were counterintui-
tive, and I couldn’t explain them. I hoped that
something would turn up in the data link re-
cordings so I sent a message to a friend at the
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (JHU/APL), a Navy University
Applied Research Center. I asked them to ana-
lyze the recordings and explained that we had
no way of paying for it, but would forever be
indebted to them. They did a very thorough
analysis of the recordings, and the answer to
our mystery became obvious. The data link
used a ‘‘roll call’’ technique, so it became satu-
rated as the number of participants increased
and hence the reporting delays increased rap-
idly, resulting in the poorer effectiveness with
more escorts.
After another sabbatical at Stanford (from
February 1968 to January 1969), I returned to
Washington and was appointed director of the
Systems Evaluation Group, CNA’s systems en-
gineering organization. I succeeded Julio (Jud)
Fermi, Enrico’s son, in the position. SEG at the
time had approximately 20 analysts, including
a mix of systems engineers and OEG-experi-
enced physicists. Many of the analysts were in-
volved with the development of conceptual
design models for ships, aircraft, and missiles.
Most of the other analysts were assigned to pro-
jects to develop requirements for Navy systems.
Whereas OEG worked with Navy operators,
SEG worked with the air and surface systems
commands in Washington.
Bob Sheldon: What was the difference in the
kind of work you were doing in the Systems
Evaluation Group?
Phil DePoy: It was much more engineering-
oriented than operations-oriented work, that is,
analysis related to the design and cost of sys-
tems rather than the employment of systems.
In September 1972, I was sent back to Viet-
nam to assess the effectiveness of a newly devel-
oped weapon. The test was highly classified,
and few people were given access to informa-
tion regarding the system. (I can’t imagine that
the system is still classified, but I won’t give de-
tails about it just in case.) The test was spon-
sored by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and
the only officer in Seventh Fleet who had full ac-
cess to the details of theweaponwas Vice Admi-
ral Damon (Hutch) Cooper, Commander of the
Carrier Battle Groups. One of my colleagues,
DonMuir, went to Hawaii to work directly with
Admiral Gayler, and I joined Admiral Cooper
on the USS Enterprise. The plan was to drop
three weapons in North Vietnam and monitor
their effectiveness. We expected the entire proj-
ect to take about one month. The weapons were
dropped soon after I arrived. I spent a few days
monitoring the weapons, and since we received
no feedback, I started working on some other
projects for the Admiral. I had first met Admiral
Cooper the day after the Tonkin Gulf attacks
when he was a Carrier Commander (I men-
tioned earlier that I had visited a carrier with
two other members of the Seventh Fleet staff).
He was a very knowledgeable and thoughtful
officer, and we had many discussions about
our Vietnam strategy.
After two and a half months with no feed-
back from theweapons, I decided to try to figure
out what was wrong. I asked a contact in Wash-
ington for more information about the system
and spent several days analyzing it. I then real-
ized that the sensitivity of the weapon was such
that it would never work in the environment
where it was employed. I drafted a very strong
message for the Admiral to send to Admiral
Gayler and took it to Admiral Cooper. He made
it even stronger! I finally arrived home at the
end of November, three months after leaving
for the one-month assignment.
Bob Sheldon: What was your role when you
returned?
Phil DePoy: In 1974, I was appointed Direc-
tor of OEG—a position I was to hold for 10
years. At the time, OEG included about 65 an-
alysts, including approximately 40 field rep-
resentatives assigned to Navy and Marine
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commands around the world. We had a great
management group. My deputy, Jamil Nakh-
leh, had worked with me in SEG, and we al-
ways had a great relationship. The Director
of the Field Office was Ruth Kolozy, who
had been with OEG for only a short time but
was phenomenal in taking care of the field
representatives. My assistant, Rita Thomp-
son, had also been with me in SEG and was
a perfectionist in every way. The four of us
worked together for nearly the entire decade.
We also had some very talented senior ana-
lysts in OEG Washington at the time who
did a great job of selecting and training new
hires.
Our major problem was that, like the mili-
tary services, the analysts were worn out! The
decade of war had resulted in everyone spend-
ing a lot of time in the field and having many
lengthy absences from home. We had too many
field assignments to fill, as a result of some bad
management decisions (for which I had shared
the responsibility). Further, interest in defense
issues had decreased among prospective hires.
Although we were able to hire a few excellent
analysts, we were unable to find enough be-
cause we were experiencing a heavier-than-
normal amount of attrition. We had never hired
women as analysts because they were not able
to live on board Navy ships or even to visit ships
for more than a day or so, and hence were unable
to gain the experience they needed.
We finally reached agreement among the
OEG management that we had to hire some
women and hope that the Navy and Marines
would accept them. This, unlike the decisions
regarding the field program, turned out to be
the correct decision at the right time. The first
group of women we hired did amazingly well.
One of them, Christine Fox, spent her first field
assignment with the Navy Fighter Command
in San Diego, a difficult place to be the first
woman analyst. She handled it so well that
she became the role model for Kelly McGillis
in the Top Gun movie. Christine later headed
the defense side of CNA (including OEG), then
was director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) for the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense for three years, and for six
months she served as the Acting Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense where, whenever the Secretary
was out of the country, she was the first woman
to direct the War Department or the Depart-
ment of Defense.
Another woman among the first that we
hired is Kathryn McGrady. In her first field as-
signment, she was assigned to the Commander
of the First Marine Division in Camp Pendleton,
California. While she was there, the Marines
deployed to Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm.
Since we thought that women were barred from
the front lines, I visited the First Marine Divi-
sion in Saudi Arabia and suggested to the Com-
mander that we could replace her prior to the
invasion if he wanted. He treated me somewhat
like the Seventh Fleet Admiral treated my boss
a couple decades earlier, and told me that he
would not give her up under any conditions.
Within a few days after my visit, he took
Kathryn up to the front lines with him. When
they tried to return, the helicopter had some sort
of problem, so Kathryn had to stay overnight. I
have no doubt that the entire event was
arranged for my benefit, to show me that she
was able to gowherever he needed her! Kathryn
is now President of CNA.
There have been many other success stories
among the other women that we hired, despite
the difficult times that they faced during the
early years when women were being integrated
into the services. Both the Navy and the Marine
Corps deserve a lot of credit for their efforts to
make it work.
Bob Sheldon: Your resume mentions the
NATO Systems Science Panel. What kind of
work was that?
Phil DePoy: I was appointed as the US Rep-
resentative to the NATO Systems Science Panel
in 1976. I was a member of the panel for four
years, serving as chair during my last year.
The Systems Science Panel was one of several
panels serving under the science side of NATO,
which was originally (in 1952) called AGARD
(Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development) but the name was changed to
the NATOResearch and Technical Organization
(RTO) in the mid-1990s. When I was with the
Systems Science Panel, our responsibility was
to sponsor meetings on various systems science
subjects, and we had a fairly large budget to
sponsor research projects throughout NATO.
Our panel met once a quarter in Brussels.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. PHIL E. DEPOY
Page 30 Military Operations Research, V21 N2 2016
It was a very interesting experience. The
panel had some very impressive members.
The member from Turkey had a PhD in OR
and had taught at CaseWestern Reserve for sev-
eral years before returning to Turkey as the sec-
ond or third most senior member of the
government. The French representative had
taught systems engineering for several years
and was then a senior member of the French
government. The British representative had
been at one time in Blackett’s group.
Each of our meetings lasted only two days,
so each of the members had to review all the ap-
plications for research projects from their coun-
try and make a recommendation whether it
should be considered by the entire panel before
coming to Brussels.
I had one experience which was quite
embarrassing but led to a great friendship. In
two subsequent quarters, the panel received
an application from Professor Andy Sage for re-
search on very large-scale complex systems. I
recognized Andy’s name because he had writ-
ten systems engineering books and papers, but
I had never met him. Reading the applications,
I decided that the work which he described
could not be achieved, so I did not recommend
funding it. After the second turn-down, I
thought that I should look at some of his pub-
lishedwork and try to learnmore about the type
of research he was doing. When I found two of
his papers on large-scale complex systems, I
was astounded. He had written themmore than
a decade before the Santa Fe Institute was
founded, and before few other engineers or sci-
entists were even interested in the subject. I im-
mediately called him and arranged to meet him
in his office at the University of Virginia. I apol-
ogized and assured him that his future work
would be considered and, if I had my way,
funded by the panel.
From that time on, we stayed in touch and
cooperated on a number of efforts. He was an
outstanding systems engineer and had a unique
sense of humor. In 2004, MITchanged the name
of their systems engineering department to ‘‘en-
gineering systems’’ and redirected it into re-
search and education concentrating more on
complex systems. They scheduled a symposium
on the new subject. I called Andy to determine if
he planned to attend, and he said that MITwas
the only institution that would move into an
area in which other people had been working
for 25 years and schedule an international sym-
posium to announce it!
Bob Sheldon:Howwas it that you eventually
finished your dissertation at Stanford? And
why did it take you so long?
Phil DePoy: I established a record of sorts in
the length of time between my oral defense and
final submission of the thesis. A professor
whom I didn’t like demanded that I change
something in the written thesis. I refused. So ev-
ery time that I was reaching the time limit (I be-
lieve it was two or three years) I would wait
until I was back in Vietnam and send a letter
asking for an extension. The kind ladywho han-
dled such things would send me a letter grant-
ing me another year. This continued until I
received a note from her that the war was over,
and I must submit the thesis! So I reversed my
‘‘stand-on-principle,’’ made the insignificant
changes, and mailed it to her.
Bob Sheldon: Did you use any of your chem-
ical engineering background in your work at
OEG and CNA?
Phil DePoy: I used very little of my chemical
engineering background. I did use some of my
nuclear engineering background at times. It
once got me in trouble with Admiral Rickover.
I found an error in a document which he had
signed, so I called a civilian on his staff whom
I had known when we were both students at
MIT. Admiral Rickover explained to me that if
he ever needed my help, he would call me. He
later told someone that what the Navy doesn’t
need are smart economists designing Navy
ships. My civilian friend believed it was tar-
geted at me.
Bob Sheldon: Did you ever have any direct
contact with Morse at OEG?
Phil DePoy:After I moved back to OEG, I in-
vited Philip Morse, the founding director of
ASWORG,whowas still teaching atMIT, to visit
us in the fall of 1981 to see what had happened
to OEG since his last visit in the 1950s. He came
for a day during which we gave him an idea of
how OEG then operated and introduced him to
several of the analysts. I scheduled him with six
or eight of our best analysts, leaving him alone
with each of them for about a half hour. At the
end of the day, I asked him what he thought
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. PHIL E. DEPOY
Military Operations Research, V21 N2 2016 Page 31
aboutwhat he had seen.He thought for aminute
or so; then replied, ‘‘I think you should close it
down. When the next war starts, start a new
group and you’ll be able to attract better peo-
ple.’’ It wasn’t exactly the response I was want-
ing, and it made it difficult when our analysts
asked me what Morse thought. I used the easy
way out, saying only that ‘‘He was impressed.’’
Morse hadwritten the same recommendation in
his book, In at the Beginnings, published in 1977,
so I should have known better than to ask him. I
did approach Morse about an idea that I had to
invite all the livingmembers of theWorldWar II
group back the following spring in 1982 for a re-
union, given that it would be the 40th anniver-
sary of the founding of ASWORG. He was
enthusiastic about that possibility and said that
he would definitely participate.
We were able to locate nearly all the World
War II ASWORG analysts who were still living
and invited them to spend a day with us the fol-
lowing April. We also invited the CNO and
Morse to be the principal speakers. I told our
people that we should plan for no more than
half of them to attend since many were located
on the West Coast, and it was a long way to
travel for a single day program. In the end, I be-
lieve that nearly 80 percent of the invitees
attended. It was great fun to hear their stories
(much better than my sea stories!). I asked sev-
eral of them why they came, given the distance
and the fact that it was only a one-day affair.
They all said that their time in ASWORG had
been the most exciting part of their lives, and
they just wanted to see their friends one more
time, many of whom they hadn’t seen since
WW II, and bring back many of their memories.
In discussions with Morse during his visits,
andwith Jay Steinhardtwho directedOEG from
1946 until 1962, I believe that OEG has stayed
true to most of the principles that Phil estab-
lished in 1942. First, Morse defined operations
research as the application of the scientific
method to the solution of complex problems.
(OEG still considers this to be their major role.)
Secondly, Morse felt that analysts had to be
assigned to the operating forces so that analysts
could develop a good understanding of opera-
tions and of problems that are encountered in
the operating environment. (This has remained
as OEG’s practice for the full 74 years of its
existence.) Morse also believed that itwas impor-
tant not to leave analysts with any operational
unit for more than six months. (As stated earlier,
this is the one practice that had to be changed
even before I joined the group 57 years ago.)
AfterMorse left ORG in 1945, he returned to
MIT for a brief period. In 1946, he became the
founding director of the Brookhaven National
Laboratory where he stayed until 1948. After
another brief stay in Cambridge, Phil was per-
suaded to become the director of research for
a newly formed government organization, the
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG),
where he served until again returning to MIT
in 1950. (WSEG later merged into the newly
formed Institute for Defense Analysis [IDA].)
The book written by Morse and Kimble,
Methods of Operations Research, resulted in the
Japanese Defense Agency formation of opera-
tions research groups in each of its services.
The Navy wanted OEG to work with its cousin
in the Japanese Admiralty from the time it was
formed. Jay Steinhardt visited the group when
he was director, and I believe that the other di-
rectors between Jay and me also visited it when
they were in Japan. I don’t know who or when
the idea of visiting them on a quarterly basis
was developed, but we did it for a few years
in the 1960s and 1970s. On the door leading to
their offices, there was a sign in English,
‘‘OEG.’’ I think it was the only sign in the Admi-
ralty that was not in Japanese and suspected
that they put it on the door only when one of
us was visiting. The group was very enthusias-
tic about OR, but we hadn’t been very effective
in teaching them. I remember that on one visit, I
derived an expansion for a solution to a nonlin-
ear differential equation and showed them how
to use the second term, i.e., the slope, to estimate
the values of two effectiveness parameters from
some data that they had collected. On my next
visit, they proudly handed me a large stack of
paper in which someone had derived the third
through eighth terms of the expansion. (At that
point, I knew that I had failed to get my point
across!)
Bob Sheldon: How did your leadership role
at CNA evolve?
Phil DePoy: In 1985, the Navy replaced
CNA’s sponsor, the University of Rochester,
with the Hudson Institute, which was founded
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by the brilliant physicist, Herman Kahn, for-
merly of RAND. Unfortunately, Herman died
suddenly between the time that Hudsonwas se-
lected and when it took over as CNA’s sponsor.
Tom Bell, the president of Hudson, became the
chairman of CNA’s Board of Directors and soon
thereafter appointed me as the acting President
of CNA. Later, the CNA Board appointed me as
president. I had mixed emotions about taking
the new position. I loved my former job as
OEG director because I was able to remain close
to Navy operations and analysis and knew that
the new position would distance me from both.
However, Hudson selected an outstanding
board, and I enjoyed working with them and
learned a great deal from the individual mem-
bers. I had always felt (and continue to feel) that
most nonprofits are poorly governed, and our
new board was a huge improvement for us.
Among the board members were General Bob
Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine
Corps; General Al Haig, former Army General,
President of United Technologies Corporation,
Secretary of State, Chief of Staff to the President,
etc.; Admiral Bob Long, former Commander of
Pacific Forces; Dan Evans, former Governor
and Senator from the State of Washington; Bill
Gates, Sr., attorney (and father of the founder
of Microsoft); Jim Schlesinger, former Secretary
of Energy and Secretary of State; Fletcher
Byrom, former CEO of Coppers Company Inc.,
and 11 others of similar backgrounds. It’s diffi-
cult to find an equivalent board anywhere,
and this board was only paid for their expenses!
Bob Sheldon: What were the major changes
during your tenure as President of CNA?
Phil DePoy: Themajor changewas the board
itself. It took a much more active role in govern-
ing CNA than the universities that had spon-
sored CNA during most of its existence. It was
also a period of rapid growth for the organiza-
tion. I was very uncomfortable with rapid
growth since my experience had been that we
tended to hire with less care than in normal
times, and it then took several years in which
to sort out some of the analysts that shouldn’t
have been hired in the first place. In fact, I was
always out-of-step with most managers. I al-
ways preferred being a part of an organization
which was truly excellent, whether or not it
has any growth at all. That was also the attitude
of Steinhardt. He often talked about the period
after World War II when OEG had to downsize.
Theywent from 65 to 25 analysts in one year, but
he was proud of the fact that he lost fewer peo-
ple than a proportional amount from the upper
half in terms of ability and potential.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have any problems
with retention in OEG or CNA?
Phil DePoy: Certainly during and immedi-
ately after the Vietnam War we did.
Further there was a drop in interest in de-
fense issues at that time, and recruiting new em-
ployees was difficult. But over most of its
existence, OEG did not have enough attrition.
Keeping enough analysts in the field requires
a constant influx of new people. After a few
years of rapid rotation to the field and back,
most analysts want to stay in Washington for
longer periods. We never had attrition near the
rate that Jay required, but fortunately, we were
able to attract enough people from the remain-
der of CNA to man the assignments.
Bob Sheldon: What were some of the signifi-
cant things that happened to CNA while you
were president?
Phil DePoy:During the time I was president,
CNAwas involved in many interesting analyti-
cal projects such as the determination of re-
quirements for the Navy’s new A-12 aircraft (a
program that was later cancelled). Also, we
were named the program manager for a new
highly classified air defense system and were
able to conduct some very interesting tests in
the fleet.
The most memorable part of the job for me
was our near-involvement in the ‘‘Ill Wind’’
procurement fraud scandal that was centered
on the office of the Assistant Secretary of Navy
(RDT&E) and involved many private firms.
The investigation and prosecutions continued
for a long period. Although we had no direct in-
volvement and in fact were credited by the
Washington Post as being one of the ‘‘whistle
blowers’’—this wasn’t true, at least we didn’t
intentionally ‘‘blow the whistle’’—but some of
our actions contributed to the realization that
there were major problems in the Navy’s acqui-
sition system.
In 1989 I realized that there were some con-
flicts of interest between CNA and our sponsor,
and I approached the Navy with the idea of
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making CNA an independent organization,
similar to most of the defense FFRDCs (feder-
ally funded research and development centers),
such as RAND and IDA. The Navy agreed, and
CNA became independent in the summer of
1990. About six months before the change, I no-
tified our board that I would like to leave CNA
when the transition was complete. I had been
thinking about a change for several years and
thought that this would be an ideal time. I had
greatly enjoyed my 301 years with OEG and
CNA, but as I told the board, I wanted to do
something different ‘‘before I died.’’ I agreed
to stay on as a senior fellow to complete some
projects with which I was involved, including
direction of a study of concepts for the next
generation aircraft carrier and establishing
an analytical support team for the 1993 Navy
and Marine base-closing effort. I also got in-
volved, along with Christine Fox, in directing
CNA’s combat analysis efforts in the Persian
Gulf War.
When I agreed to extend my time at CNA, I
thought it would be for six months to a year, but
it turned out to be a full two years. I finally de-
parted CNA in the summer of 1992 and became
the president and CEO of the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) at the University of
Chicago. It was a huge change for me from
CNA. Being on a campus again and dealing
with such a great faculty was wonderful, and
learning about survey research was fascinating.
NORC had pioneered complex studies in
health, education, labor, mental health, housing,
aging, and substance abuse, and dealt with
many government agencies with which I had
little experience. I enjoyed my job very much
but I left after eight years, not because of being
tired of what I was doing, but because eight Chi-
cago winters had exhausted me!
Bob Sheldon: What kind of work did you do
at NORC? Was it something like Gallup polls?
Phil DePoy: NORC doesn’t do polling. It
does major surveys, mainly for the federal
government. In a sense, they are adjuncts to
the census. Some are longitudinal surveys in
which the same respondents are surveyed at
one or two year intervals for many years.
Probably the most well-known of NORC sur-
veys is the General Social Survey which has
been conducted since 1972. It is an in-person
survey of demographic characteristics and
opinions. Until 1994, it was conducted each
year. Since then it has been conducted at
two-year intervals. We also prepared the an-
nual ‘‘Best Hospitals’’ issue for US News and
World Report. In addition, NORC is the home
for several multidisciplinary research centers
of university faculty members.
Bob Sheldon:Howdo they pick their samples?
Phil DePoy: NORC has a group of excellent
statisticians who are responsible for sampling.
Bob Sheldon: Were your results ever scruti-
nized or questioned for credibility?
Phil DePoy: Oh yes, frequently.
Bob Sheldon: How did you respond to those
challenges?
Phil DePoy: All of our work was well-
documented, from survey design and sampling
to the analysis of results.
Bob Sheldon: How large a group was it in
Chicago?
Phil DePoy: Our total staff was on the order
of 300.
Bob Sheldon: What was your next job?
Phil DePoy: I then decided to accept a posi-
tion of ‘‘distinguished visiting professor of war-
fare studies and chair of expeditionarywarfare’’
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) inMon-
terey, California (where the winters are much
milder than Chicago!). I hoped to be able to do
some research in several areas that I had en-
countered during my years with the Navy and
to have time to document some of my experi-
ences. But within a matter of weeks after arriv-
ing, the Admiral in charge of NPS asked me to
form an Institute of Systems Engineering. NPS
had already started to teach systems engineer-
ing, but the Navy was pressuring them to in-
crease the effort. An old friend, Walt Laberge,
was, at the time, retired and living near Monte-
rey. Walt had been the first program director for
the Sidewinder missile at China Lake, Director
of the lab at China Lake, Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force, Under Secretary of the Army,
and Vice President of Lockheed. He called one
day and said that he would join me on a part-
time basis if I became involved with the new In-
stitute. (He later admitted that hiswifewas tired
of having him home all day after he retired, so
he needed to escape!) Walt and I started the In-
stitute in early 2001.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . DR. PHIL E. DEPOY
Page 34 Military Operations Research, V21 N2 2016
Bob Sheldon: What was involved in setting
up the Institute of Systems Engineering?
Phil DePoy: Since a systems engineering and
a systems engineering management curricula
were already in place, there was not a great deal
to add at the creation. During the first year, we
began teaching in some of the warfare centers
via television. That program has now expanded
and the last time I checked, NPS has more than
400 students in the centers enrolled in a systems
engineering program leading to a master’s de-
gree. We also created an annual class project in
which the on-campus class was assigned a ma-
jor systems engineering project. The first year,
we assigned the systems engineering class, in
conjunction with the ships systems engineer-
ing class (that was located in the engineering
school), a project to design two small high-
speed ships, including one that could carry
a number of aircraft. The group did an excel-
lent job, and some people claim (or blame)
the study for leading to the LCS (Littoral Com-
bat Ship).
Bob Sheldon: Who determined there was
a need for this curriculum?
Phil DePoy: Itwas requested by theViceChief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Don Pilling.
Bob Sheldon:Do you knowwhat the basis for
his decision was?
Phil DePoy: The lack of ‘‘systems thinking’’
had been an issue throughout the Defense De-
partment as military systems and ‘‘systems of
systems’’ had grownmore complex. He felt that
more officers should be educated in systems en-
gineering.
Bob Sheldon: What else did you do at NPS?
Phil DePoy: In 2001, at the request of the
CNO, the Navy had started a program in Exec-
utive Education at NPS in which they brought
20 senior admirals to the campus for 10 days
each month. We took them to visit ITcompanies
in Silicon Valley and had corporate executives
come to the campus to explain how modern IT
firms were managed. The founding director of
the effort left NPS in 2002, so I was asked to take
over his responsibilities, in addition to those in
the Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
(which had then been named in honor of Rear
AdmiralWayne E.Meyer who had been the first
program manager of the AEGIS project). I man-
aged the Executive Institute for one year and
enjoyed meeting many executives at firms such
as Apple, IBM, INTEL, Sun Microsystems, and
Kleiner Perkins. I continued to manage the
Meyer Institute until the summer of 2005 when
I decided that it was time to retire.
I moved back to the Washington area, but I
have remained as a member of one advisory
board (Applied Physics Laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Washington). I served for six years
(four as chairman) of the Department of Home-
land Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee. Recently Iwas appointed as a Senior
Fellow at the Applied Physics Laboratory at
Johns Hopkins University.
Bob Sheldon: I noticed on your bio that you
have awards from the Army, the Air Force, the
Navy, and the Defense Distinguished Public
Service Award. How did you manage to get all
those different service awards?
Phil DePoy: I was Vice Chairman of the
Army Science Board for three years, from 1978
to 1981. And then I was on the Air Force Science
Advisory Board from 1983 to 1987.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of studies did you
do for the Air Force?
Phil DePoy: The largest one I remember was
concerned with airfield vulnerability. It was
a very interesting effort. I had directed the study
for several months before the Air Force Chief of
Staff discovered that I was the director. Know-
ing my Navy background, he ordered that I be
reassigned within the Science Board with the
comment that ‘‘they have put the wolf in the
hen house!’’ I strongly resented the implication
that I was ‘‘spying’’ on the Air Force and
resigned from the board.
Bob Sheldon: Do you have any hobbies or
professional activities to keep you busy now?
Phil DePoy: I play some golf, albeit poorly.
Bob Sheldon: Looking back, how do you feel
about your overall career as an analyst?
Phil DePoy: I am often asked if I am sorry
that I worked in OR, rather than engineering,
for so many years. I respond that if I had known
in 1959 what OR (or OA as I have used the
terms) was, I would not have joined OEG. But
given that I did, I’m very pleased and can’t
imagine that any other career would have been
as rewarding in so manyways. From the adven-
tures; the vast numbers of very interesting peo-
ple I have been associated with in OEG, CNA,
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themilitary, and the government; and the fulfill-
ment of working on so many important issues
could not have occurred in any other career.
The only downside that comes to mind is that
my career was very difficult for my family. My
long absences, and evenmore important the un-
certainty in the length of absences, were damag-
ing, but it was not anyworse thanmanymilitary
families endure.
As I think about my career, I am amazed at
the amount of effort that the Navy made in ed-
ucating and training me and my colleagues in
OEG. (I shouldmention that when I say ‘‘Navy,’’
I mean ‘‘Navy andMarines.’’) I have mentioned
several instanceswhen theNavywent out of the
way to educate me, e.g., flight experiences at
VX-5, experience in the Pentagon with Admiral
Moorer, the orientation aboard the USS Kitty
Hawk, and there have been many, many others.
I have always felt that I could never do enough
to repay them but only hope that I have made
a significant partial repayment.
Bob Sheldon:Do you have any parting shots?
Phil DePoy: I have talked about my own ex-
periences and have said very little about the
many great contributions that were made by
my colleagues and are still being made by
OEG. Keith Tidman reported in his book, The
Operations Evaluation Group, on many contribu-
tions that were made by OEG analysts through
the late 1970s, and I hope that someonewill doc-
ument many of the more recent efforts.
I want to thank MORS and particularly Bob
Sheldon for this interview. It has given me
a chance to document many of my experiences
that I have wanted to preserve. Bob has been in-
credibly persistent (for more than a decade!)
and immensely patient in the process, and it
never would have occurred without him.
I would also like to thank a number of peo-
ple who were kind enough to read this lengthy
interview andmake very substantial corrections
and suggestions for improvement, including
Alan Brown, Christine Fox, Wayne Hughes,
Jamil Nakhleh, Ferd Neider, Gene Visco, and
my wife, Norma Lou.
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